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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES/STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court err in finding that Mr. Covey had impliedly 
"waived" his constitutional right to jury trial by arriving late at a pre-
trial hearing? 
Standard of review: "Matters of statutory interpretation present questions of law 
which [this Court] review[s] for correctness, according no particular deference to the trial 
court's interpretation." State v. Coleman, 2001 UT App 281, [^5, 34 P.3d 790. 
2. Did the trial court misinterpret basic terms in the Loan Accommodation 
Agreement, and then rely on the misunderstood terms in drawing its 
Conclusions of Law? 
Standard of review: 'The interpretation of an unambiguous contract is a question 
of law which does not require any particular deference to the trial court's interpretation of 
the contract." Allstate Ins. Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Group, 868 P.2d 110, 112 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1994). 
3. Did the trial court err in concluding that a tax consequence would have 
occurred had Ms. Covey used the Walker Lane Sale proceeds to 
repurchase Sears shares, and then in relying on this erroneous legal 
conclusion to find that she had no duty to mitigate her damages, and 
was not estopped from claiming such damages? 
Standard of review: whether a particular* transaction would incur a tax 
consequence is a legal question (Utah State Retirement Office v. Salt Lake County, 780 
P.2d 813, 815 (Utah 1989), and therefore its consideration at trial is entitled to no 
deference and is reviewed for correctness (Hercules, Inc. v. Utah State Tax Comm 77, 
2000 UT App 372, [^6, 21 P.3d 231). 
4. Did the trial court err in finding (1) that Ms. Covey held the Walker 
Lane Sale proceeds as collateral for further performance by Mr. Covey, 
(2) that the proceeds were "held in escrow'1 by Ms. Covey, and (3) that 
there was no agreement surrounding Ms. Covey's receipt and retention 
of the Walker Lane Sale proceeds? 
2 
Standard of review: "[F]indings of fact are reviewed under the clearly erroneous 
stmdaid[.T Morse v. Packer, 2000 UT 86,1fl6, 15 P.3d 1021. 
5. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in ordering specific 
performance? 
Standard of review: "Specific performance as a remedy will stand and will not be 
upset on appeal in the absence of an abuse of discretion." Morse v. Packer, 2000 UT 86, 
K16, 15 P.3d 1021. 
6. Did the trial court err in concluding that Mr. Covey should be 
personally liable for the $55,000.00 in funds that were transferred out of 
Ms. Covey's account at Covey & Co.? 
Standard of review: "For purposes of appellate review, the trial court's decision to 
pierce the corporate veil will be upheld if there is substantial evidence in favor of the 
judgment." Morse v. Packer, 2000 UT 86,1fl6, 15 P.3d 1021. 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES 
AND RULES 
Any determinative constitutional provisions, statutes or rules are set forth in the 
addenda to this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This appeal is from a Final Judgment (Add. 1) of the Third Judicial District Court, 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah. The statement of the case is more specifically spelled 
out in the following Statement of Facts. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. In September, 1991, Defendant-Appellant Almon Milner Covey ("Mr. 
Covey") asked his younger sister, Plaintiff-Appellee Noel Milner Covey ("Ms. Covey"), 
j 
to loan him 7,219 shares of Sears & Roebuck stock ("Sears stock"); she consented. (R. at 
613; F. ofF. 1,4; Add. 2) 
2. Mr. Covey and Ms. Covey entered into a Loan Accommodation Agreement 
("the Agreement") (Add. 3) on September 10, 1991. (R. at 614; F. of F. 7; Add. 2.) 
3. Under the terms of the Agreement, Ms. Covey loaned 7,219 shares of Sears 
& Roebuck stock ("Sears stock") to Mr. Covey, who agreed to return the stock within 30 
days. (R. at 614; F. of F. 9, 10; Add. 2.) As collateral for the stock loan, Mr. Covey 
conveyed a "Warranty Deed" and "Notice of Interest in Real Property" covering his 
property in Holladay, Utah, a property which is known in this litigation as the "Walker 
Lane Property." (R. at 615; F. of F. 13; Add. 2.) 
4. The Agreement provided that in the event Mr. Covey failed to return the 
Sears stock, Ms. Covey was entitled to take title to the propeity "in lieu thereof." (PL's 
Ex. 1; Add. 3, ^ 5, 6.)1 The trial court found that these paragraphs only applied in the 
event the stock could not be returned due to a margin call. (R. at 615; F. of F. 14, 17; 
Add. 2.) 
5. Mr. Covey failed to deliver the Sears stock as required, and thereby 
breached the Agreement. (R. at 616-17; F. of F. 22, 26; Add. 2.) Ms. Covey recorded 
her Notice of Interest on September 20, 1991. (PL's Ex. 3.) 
1
 The exhibits introduced at trial were not given a record identification number; 
therefore they are only cited by their exhibit number. The exhibits are contained in a 
separate unnumbered manila envelope as part of the record of this case. 
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6. Several years later Ms. Covey consented to remove her Notice of Interest so 
that Mr. Covey could sell the Walker Lane Property. (R. at 622; F. of F. 62; Add. 2.) 
7. On October 28, 1996, Mr. Covey sold the Walker Lane Property in a 
transaction known among the parties as the "Walker Lane Sale." This sale generated net 
proceeds to Ms. Covey of $1,118,827.05 (R. at 622; F. of F. 61; Add. 2), which were 
transferred the next day to Ms. Covey, who placed them in a bank account controlled 
solely by her. (R. at 622, 623; F. of F. 61, 62, 69; Add. 2; R. at 1023, Tr. at 179,1. 14-
22.) Mr. Covey intended this sum to cover the loss of the stock and all other debts he 
owed to Ms. Covey. (R. at 1024; Tr. at 307-08.) 
8. According to Ms. Covey's own testimony, there was no written proof 
which could substantiate her claim that she held the Walker Lane Sale proceeds as 
collateral for any sort of later settlement. (R. at 1023, Tr. at 180,1. 14-23.) 
9. Despite the lack of any written or oral agreement, the trial court found that 
the proceeds of the Walker Lane Sale were "held in escrow" after their transfer to Ms. 
Covey (R. at 624; F. of F. 73; Add. 2.) 
10. The trial court further found that had Ms. Covey used the proceeds of the 
Walker Lane Sale to replace her shares of Sears stock, she "would have incurred an 
immediate detriment in the form of capital gains taxes." (R. at 623, 624; F. of F. 68, 70; 
Add. 2.) 
11. When Ms. Covey filed her original complaint on November 20, 1997, she 
demanded a trial by jury. (R. at 1.) 
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12. The law firm of Cohne, Rappaport & Segal, P.C. ("CRS"), entered as 
counsel for Mr. Covey effective January 3, 2001 at 2:30 p.m., less than two weeks before 
trial. (See Appearance of Counsel, R. at 441.) Earlier that day, CRS appeared at a 
pretrial conference on behalf of Mr. Covey as a friend of the court. (R. at 443.) 
13. Mr. Covey failed to arrive timely to the pretrial conference (which was held 
in chambers, off the record; R. at 443) and so could not represent himself other than 
through CRS as a friend of the court; nevertheless, the trial court refused to acknowledge 
any authority on the part of CRS to represent the interests of Mr. Covey. (R. at 1023, Tr. 
at 23,1. 9-15.) This refusal to acknowledge the authority of CRS to act on behalf of Mr. 
Covey was maintained despite CRS5 representation that "[fjinal arrangements were 
made" as to its authority, and that only the formalities remained (i.e. the signing of a 
contract for representation and the filing of an Appearance of Counsel). (R. at 1023, Tr. 
at 8,1. 10-15.) 
14. At the pretrial conference, the trial court suggested that Ms. Covey waive 
her jury demand; she agreed, and a bench trial was scheduled over the objections of CRS 
on Mr. Covey's behalf. (R. at 1023, Tr. at 8, 1. 8-10, 16-17; Tr. at 10, 1. 18-21; R. at 
443.) The trial judge found that Mr. Covey had waived his right to a jury trial "by not 
requesting it in the first place, ... by ... not appearing at the pre-trial conference and ... by 
not being so prepared with jury instructions and other matters, to proceed on the—or with 
the trial by jury at or about the time of the pre-trial conference as required by the Court." 
(R. at 1023, Tr. at 23,1. 16-25.) The judge later (on the first day of trial) recanted the 
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idea that not being prepared with jury instructions at the pretrial conference would impact 
a decision as to waiver, stating at trial, "I'm not going to fault you for that because I think 
you could well have gotten those together shortly thereafter^]" (R. at 1023, Tr. at 24,1. 
15-20.) 
15. The next day, on January 4, 2001, Mr. Covey, through counsel, filed a 
formal Jury Demand. (R. at 445.) 
16. On the first day of trial, January 16, 2001, Mr. Covey asked the court to 
reconsider its decision concerning waiver of jury trial, and again cited U.R.C.P. Rule 
38(d). (R. at 1023, Tr. at 23,1. 3-9.) In response, the trial judge expressly admitted that 
consent was not given, stating, "If the last sentence of Paragraph (d) [of Rule 38] is read 
to mean that that can only be withdrawn after—after one party has demanded it, by both 
parties consenting, then I acknowledge for the record that the defendant has not 
consented." (R. at 1023, Tr. at 23,1. 3-9.) 
17. The trial court found, among other additional damages, that Mi*. Covey was 
liable personally for an unauthorized transfer from Ms. Covey's personal stock account at 
the brokerage company owned by Mr. Covey, Covey & Company ("Covey & Co."), 
which damaged Ms. Covey in the amount of $55,484.15. (R. at 619; F. of F. 40; Add. 2.) 
ARGUMENT 
1. The trial court misapplied the law in finding that Appellant had waived his 
right to a jury trial. 
Mr. Covey was denied the fundamental constitutional right to a jury trial found in the 
7 
Utah and U S Constitutions mainly because he was late to a pre-trial hearmg Although 
counsel on his behalf had not yet formally entered an appeal ance, counsel did appear timely 
at the hearing and attempt to represent his mterests The trial judge would have none of it, 
entered a default judgment agamst him (fiom which he was later granted relief) and, after 
suggesting that Ms Covey withdraw her jury demand, disregarded the rules of civil 
procedure and found that Mr Covey had "waived" his right to jury trial 
(a) Mr. Covey should have been allowed to rely on the jury demand 
filed by Ms. Covey. 
The issue of whether other parties to a case may rely on one party's demand for a jury 
trial without filing a demand themselves is a novel issue undei Utah law Howevei, U R C P 
Rule 38 is identical to its federal counterpart (1 e Fed R Civ P 38(d) (2002)), and is 
lecogmzed as such in the Utah Rule 38 Compilers Notes Under case law interpreting the 
federal Rule 38, "once one party files a demand for a jury trial, other parties are entitled to 
rely upon that demand for the issues it covers, and they need not file their own demand " 
Moore \ Federal Practice, 3d ed § 38 52[2][c][i] (2001), see also Howes v Kelly Services, 
Inc , 2002 N D 131, \ 14, 649 N W 2d 218 (citmg Fuller v City of Oakland, 47 F 3d 1522, 
1531 (9th Cn 1995)), Dell Vrfano v Romano, 962 F 2d 199, 202 (2nd Cir 1992), In re N-
500L Cases, 691 F 2d 15, 22 (1st Cir 1982), SouthlandReship, Inc v Flegel, 534 F 2d 639, 
643 (5th Cn 1976) This light to rely upon the jury demand of anothei party applies "even 
if the party demanding a jury trial is subsequently dismissed from the action " Mid Kansas 
Fed Sav and Loan Ass 'n of Wichita by and through Resolution Trust Corp v Orpheum 
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Theater Co., Ltd., 810 F. Supp. 1184, 1190 (D. Kan. 1990). One important justification for 
this "right to rely" is that it is economical, and prevents the filing of superfluous jury 
demands. Rosen v. Dick, 639 F.2d 82, 91 (2nd Cir. 1980). 
Defendant Covey relied on Plaintiffs demand for a jury trial and did not consent 
when Plaintiff withdrew its jury demand. The trial court made no finding that Mr. Covey 
consented2; rather, it incorrectly found that he had "waived" his right. Despite Mr. Covey's 
reliance on Plaintiff s previous demand, despite his own filing of a jury demand one day after 
Plaintiffs surprising withdrawal, and despite the clear language in Rule 38(d) preventing a 
party from withdrawing a jury demand without the "consent of the parties," the court below 
found that Defendant had "waived" his right to a jury trial. Mr. Covey maintains that this 
ruling was an error of law. 
(b) The trial court was required to make a finding of express "consent" 
to the withdrawal of jury demand, rather than a finding of implied 
waiver. 
Under Utah law, "[mjatters of statutory interpretation present questions of law which. 
we review for correctness, according no particular deference to the trial court's 
interpretation." State v. Coleman, 2001 UT App 281, ^ [5, 34 P.3d 790. Courts are required 
to interpret a statute's terms "as a comprehensive whole and not in piecemeal fashion." 
Brixon & Christopher Architects, P.C v. State, 2001 UT App 210, f 15, 29 P.3d650 (internal 
alterations, citation omitted). All provisions of a statute must be given meaning, if possible, 
2
 In fact, the trial judge admitted on the record that Mr. Covey did not consent, a 
fact which is discussed in greater detail below. (R. at 1023, Tr. at 23, 1. 3-9.) 
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and must be interpreted "in harmony with other provisions in the same statute and with other 
statutes under the same and related chapters." Id. (internal alterations, citations omitted). 
As is explored in detail below, the trial court in this case ignored the plain language of Rule 
38(d), and failed to harmonize it with the terms of U.R.C.P. Rule 39(a). 
The right to a jury trial in a civil action at law is a constitutional right protected by the 
Seventh Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, and by Article I, Section 10 of the Utah 
Constitution. The Utah Constitution provides that this right "shall be waived unless 
demanded," a limitation on the right which is incorporated into U.R.C.P. Rule38. However, 
Rule 38 also provides that a demand for trial by jury "may not be withdrawn without the 
consent of the parties." U.R.C.P. Rule 38(d). Thus, a party may waive its light to a jury trial 
if it does not file a jury demand and no other party files such a demand; but once any party 
has filed such a demand, the demand "may not be withdrawn without the consent of the 
parties." 
In other words, once a party who has filed a jury demand withdraws the demand, 
other parties must affirmatively "consent" to the withdrawal. Thus, a finding of "waiver" 
is irrelevant smce, once invoked under Rule 38, this right does not get "waived" but may 
only be "withdrawn." In any event, "as the right of jury trial is fundamental, courts indulge 
eveiy reasonable presumption against waiver." Aetna Ins. Co. v. Kennedy to UseofBogash, 
301 U.S. 389, 393 (1937). If courts must indulge "every reasonable presumption" against 
waiver, they ought also to indulge an equally heavy presumption against a finding of consent 
to withdrawal. 
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Moreover, under Rule 39(a), once trial by jury has been demanded, the trial of all 
issues on which a jury was demanded must be by jury, unless: 
(1) [t]he parties or their attorneys of record, by written stipulation filed with 
the court or by an oral stipulation made in open court and entered in the 
record, consent to trial by the court sitting without a jury, or 
(2) [t]he court upon motion or of its own initiative finds that a right of trial 
by jury of some or all of those issues does not exist, or 
(3) [ejither party to the issue fails to appear at the trial. 
U.R.C.P. 39(a) (2002). So, Rule 38(d) requires "consent of the parties" before a jury, 
demand may be withdrawn; and Rule 39(a) provides the mechanism by which such a 
withdrawal may be effected. The trial court ignored this statutory approach and simply 
found that Mr. Covey had "waived" his right to a jury trial. Even if "waiver" were 
synonymous with "consent" (and many courts do seem to use the terms interchangeably), 
Rule 39(a) governs the situations under which consent to a Rule 38(d) withdrawal may be 
found. 
Exception (2) does not apply in this case because the trial court below did not find 
that a right of trial by jury did not exist. Exception (3) does not apply because the trial court 
did not fmd that Mr. Covey failed "to appear at the trial;" he was found merely to have been. 
a half-hour late to a pre-trial hearing. Therefore, the only exception available to the trial 
court was exception (1), which required a written or oral stipulation consenting to trial 
without a jury. Yet the record clearly indicates that there was no such written or oral 
consent. 
In fact, the trial judge admitted that there was no consent. In his words, "[i]f the last 
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sentence of Paragraph (d) [of Rule 38] is read to mean that that can only be withdrawn 
after—after one party has demanded it, by both parties consenting, then I acknowledge for 
the record that the defendant has not consented." (R. at 1023, Tr. at 23,1. 3-9 (emphasis 
added).) Since the last sentence is in fact read to mean that a party can only withdraw a jury 
demand "by both parties consenting," as the trial judge put it, the trial judge misapplied Rule 
38(d). 
In finding that Mr. Covey had impliedly waived his right to jury trial, the trial court 
both ignored the plain language of Rule 38(d) (requiring all parties' consent to withdrawal), 
and failed to read it in conjunction with Rule 39(a) (listing the three circumstances under 
which a bench trial may be had after a jury trial is demanded) in order to give meaning to 
Rule 39(a)(1) (requiring express consent of the parties, either orally on the record, or in 
writing). 
(c) Even if "waiver" is the appropriate finding or is substantially 
equivalent to a finding of consent, the actions of Defendant 
constituted grounds for neither waiver nor consent. 
Even if, despite the language of Rule 39(a), consent could be implied through Mi*. 
Covey's actions, the trial court cited no evidence from which it could reasonably be inferred 
that Mr. Covey consented to Ms. Covey's withdrawal of her jury demand. Therefore, his 
finding of "waiver" constituted clear error. 
At the pretrial conference, thirteen days prior to trial, the trial judge found that "Mr. 
Covey's lack of preparation [i.e. of jury instiaictions], lack of promptness and lack of ability 
to proceed with a jury should constitute a waiver of that jury." (R. at 1023, Tr. at 15,1. 22-
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24.) The trial judge also found it apparently significant that the jury demand that was filed 
on January 4, 2001 by Defendant (12 days prior to the first day of trial) with "no 
accompanying jury instructions nor any other evidence that there was the ability to proceed 
with the trial and there was no serving on the plaintiff of appropriate jury instructions so the 
plaintiff could so be prepared for the jury trial." (R. at 1023, Tr. at 16,1. 7-17.) 
However, at trial the judge recanted the idea that not being prepared with jury 
instructions at the pretrial conference would impact a decision as to waiver, stating, "I'm not 
going to fault you for that because I think you could well have gotten those together shortly 
thereafter[.]" (R. at 1023, Tr. at 24,1. 15-20.) This effectively limited his justification for 
finding waiver to one single point: that Mr. Covey was a half-hour late to a pre-trial hearing. 
Even though he did ultimately arrive at the hearing, even though he had counsel representing 
him (albeit unofficially) throughout the hearing, and even though there is a constitutional 
right to jury trial as well as a heavy presumption against waiver, the trial court found that Mr. 
Covey had waived his right to jury trial. In the face of all the facts, this constituted clear 
error. 
2. The trial court misinterpreted basic terms of the Loan Accommodation 
Agreement, and relied on those misinterpreted terms in justifying its 
Conclusions of Law. 
The court below found the Agreement to be "clear and unambiguous" and this finding 
is not challenged by Mr. Covey in this appeal. (R. at 614; F. of F. 8; Add. 2.) Under Utah 
law, "the interpretation of an unambiguous contract is a question of law which does not 
require any particular deference to the trial court's interpretation of the contract." Allstate 
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Ins. Co. v. Liberty MuL Ins. Group, 868 P.2d 110, 112 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). Furthermore, 
to the extent that this Court finds any ambiguity in the terms of the Agreement, it is black-
letter law in Utah that a contract is to be construed against its drafter. Jones, Waldo, 
Holdbrook & McDonough v. Dawson, 923 P.2d 1366, 1372 (Utah 1996). Ms. Covey's 
attorney drafted the Agreement. (R. at 1023, Tr. at 148,1. 8-23; Tr. at 161,1. 10-13.) 
(a) The unambiguous Agreement anticipated many potential 
circumstances under which the Sears Stock might not be returned, 
and the trial court's failure to properly interpret the Agreement 
caused it to erroneously find that Ms. Covey's acceptance of the 
Walker Lane Sale proceeds did not constitute an accord and 
satisfaction or an election of remedies. 
In its Conclusions of Law, the trial court found that the ''unambiguous" Agreement 
"anticipated only one circumstance in which the Sears Stock could be sold, namely, if Covey 
& Co. executed on the Sears Stock to satisfy margin requirements in Almon Milner Covey's 
personal margin account at Covey & Co." (R. at 627; C. of L. 4.) Yet even a cursory 
reading of paragraph 5 of the Agreement (Add. 3) shows that any number of circumstances 
under which the Sears Stock could be sold were, in fact, anticipated. As stated in paragraph 
5 of the Agreement, Cw[i]n the event Borrower fails to return the Securities and pay the Loan 
Obligation... within sixty (60) days of this Agreement, [Lender] Shall be entitled to take title 
to the real property in lieu thereof... ." Paragraph 1 provides this same entitlement (i.e. "to 
take title to the real property in lieu thereof) in the event the Sears stock was sold pursuant 
to a margin call; but paragraph 5 is not limited to that circumstance. 
The trial court's failure to correctly interpret this provision is significant because two 
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of Mr. Covey's defenses were based on the assumption that the Agreement provided a 
specific remedy (i.e. the Walker Lane property) for any failure to return the Sears stock. The 
court appears to have believed that there could be no accord and satisfaction as a result of 
Ms. Covey's receipt of the Walker Lane Sale proceeds (the functional equivalent of taking 
title to the property) unless Mr. Covey's failure to return the securities was due to their being 
sold to satisfy margin requirements in Mr. Covey's personal stock account at Covey and Co. 
Otherwise the court would have found no significance in the reason for Mr. Covey's failure 
to return the securities. Yet in truth, the unambiguous terms of the Agreement allowed for 
the Walker Lane property to take the place of the securities if Mr. Covey failed to return the 
securities for any reason. 
Similarly, the trial court's failure to correctly inteipret the "in lieu thereof provision 
of the Agreement was a significant factor in its determination that there was no election of 
remedies when Ms. Covey accepted the Walker Lane Sale proceeds as alleged by Mr. Covey. 
The trial court appears to have erroneously believed that Ms. Covey's receipt of the Walker 
Lane Sale proceeds did not constitute an election of remedies because the Agreement did not 
anticipate the unexplained sale of the securities by Covey and Co. without Mr. Covey's 
consent. (R. at 615-16; F. of F. 17-18; Add. 2.) In other words, if the Agreement had 
anticipated any failure (rather than only a margin-call-related failure), then Ms. Covey's 
receipt and retention of the Walker Lane Sale proceeds would have at least created a 
rebuttable presumption that they were being received pursuant to the Agreement and 
therefore constituted an election. 
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Such presumption would have been cieated because Ms Covey's receipt of the 
proceeds would have been anticipated by a written mstrument (1 e the Agreement), and her 
oral testimony concerning the "real" reason why she letamed the proceeds (as "collateral") 
would have been trumped by the reason expressed m the written instrument The trial court 
found the instrument to be unambiguous, therefore oral testimony concerning its meamng 
could not be considered See Smith v Osguthorpe, 2002 UT App 361, 1(17, 58 P 3d 854 
(noting that the parol evidence rule prevents parties to a written contract fiom offering oral 
statements "for the purpose of varying or adding to the terms o f the contract) Ms Covey's 
decision to receive the proceeds of the Walker Lane Sale was anticipated by the Agreement 
and, accoidmg to Paragraph 5, was intended to be "in lieu o f hei claim to the Seais stock 
(Pi's Ex l,Add 3atU5,R atl024,Tr at307-08) The failure ofthe trial court to see this 
as an election of remedies is attributable to its erroneous interpretation ofthe Agreement 
(b) The unambiguous Agreement expressly provided that title to the 
property, if taken, would be taken "in lieu" ofthe Sears stock; and 
when Ms. Covey accepted the Walker Lane Sale proceeds, such 
action constituted an accord and satisfaction and an election of 
remedies. 
The trial court enoneously found that there was no separate "common agreement oi 
understanding" surrounding the surrender by Mr Covey of ovei $ 1 1 million m cash (R 
at 624, F of F 73, Add 2 ) The court found that the proceeds ofthe Walkei Lane Sale were 
retained by Ms Covey "as collateral foi [Mr ] Covey's peiformance of his obligation to 
lestore her Sears stock" (R at 625, F ofF 75, Add 2 ) Butthe Agreement itself provided 
the "common agreement or understanding" which covered the transfei ofthe Walker Lane 
16 
Sale pioceeds to Ms Covey The expiess language of the Agreement, which allowed for Ms 
Covey's takmg of title to the property "in lieu" of the Sears stock if theie was a failuie to 
timely return the stock for any reason, should have created a presumption that she was actmg 
pursuant to the Agreement when she did in fact accept mto her exclusive possession the 
entire net proceeds of the Walker Lane Sale 
Yet the court, in findmg that Mi Covey failed to meet his burden of demonstrating 
an accord and satisfaction, cited its incorrect contractual interpretation that only one situation 
was anticipated m which the Seais stock might not be returned, as a basis foi findmg that the 
$1,118,827 05 was not received by Ms Covey pursuant to any "common agreement 01 
undei standing " The couit found that Ms Covey "testified repeatedly that she had nevei 
entered 01 reached any such agieement 01 undei standing" that she would accept the net 
pioceeds of the Walker Lane Sale in complete satisfaction of all Mr Covey's outstandmg 
debts (R at 624, F of F 71, Add 2) This was not true m light of the clear and 
unambiguous terms of the Agreement 
Considenng the expiess terms of the Agreement, which anticipated an unexplamed 
failure to return the Seais stock and provided a remedy foi such failure, pioof of Ms Covey's 
acceptance of the net pioceeds of the Walker Lane Sale should have constituted a prima facie 
defense of accord and satisfaction, as well as of estoppel and election of lemedies The trial 
court ened as a matter of law by finding that Mt Covey had "failed to meet his burden" as 
to accord and satisfaction, estoppel, and election of remedies, lathei than findmg that he had 
met his burden and it was rebutted as to each defense 
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3. The trial court erred in concluding that a tax consequence would have 
occurred had Ms. Covey used the Walker Lane Sale proceeds to 
repurchase the Sears shares, and then in using this erroneous conclusion 
to justify its conclusion that she had no duty to mitigate her damages. 
Whether a particular transaction would incur a tax consequence is a legal question. 
See e.g. Utah State Retirement Office v. Salt Lake County, 780 P.2d 813, 815 (Utah 
1989)(addressing the "legal question of whether [certain] real estate ... is exempt from ad 
valorem property taxes"). Legal questions require conclusions of law; conclusions of law 
by a lower court or commissioner are accorded no deference and are reviewed for 
correctness. Atlas Steel, Inc. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 2002 UT 112, f l5 , 2002 WL 
31549389; Hercules Inc. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 2000 UT App 372, f6, 21 P.3d 231 
(noting that the "[tax] Commission's interpretation of the tax code is a question of law[;] 
accordingly, we grant the Commission's interpretation no deference"); Nestle Holdings, Inc. 
v. C.I.R., 152 F.3d 83, 86 (2nd Cir. 1998)(notmg that appellate courts "review cle novo 
questions of law concerning the tax consequences" of a particular business transaction). 
The trial court's entire basis for finding that Mr. Covey failed to meet his burden of 
proving a failure to mitigate on the part of Ms. Covey was that Ms. Covey "would have 
incurred an immediate detriment" if she had used the Walker Lane Sale proceeds to purchase 
replacement shares of the Sears stock. (R. at 623; F. of F. 68; Add. 2) But the court had no 
legal basis, nor did it cite any, for its conclusion that Ms. Covey's purchase of replacement 
shares would have incurred a tax consequence. The court seems simply to have believed Ms. 
Covey's bald (and hearsay) statement that her lawyer told her there would be a tax 
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consequence if she bought leplacement shaies (R at 1024, Tr at 381-82) Mi Covey was 
so certain there would be no tax consequence (except possibly one that had already 
happened) that he testified that he was willing to pay the taxes, if any were incuried (R at 
1024, Tr at 3 20,1 17-18) The court did not find that his testimony was without weight, and 
did not specifically refuse to believe him, it merely ignored his testimony A tiial court's 
conclusion of law without factual justification must be leversed Parks v Zions First Nat 7 
Bank, 673 P 2d 590, 601 (Utah 1983), Anderson v Utah County Bd of Comm 'rs, 589 P 2d 
1214, 1216 (Utah 1979) The trial court heie did not justify its fmdmg that a tax 
consequence would have resulted fiom Ms Covey's purchase of leplacement shaies 
Furthermore, the trial court committed legal en or by misallocating the burden of proof 
on the issue of mitigation of damages Proving the existence of an "immediate detriment" 
upon the purchase of replacement shaies was not Mi Covey's burden Once Mi Covey had 
established a prima facie argument foi a failure to mitigate damages, the burden was on Ms 
Covey to show that it would be unreasonable to expect her to mitigate damages (m this case 
by showing that a tax consequence would have resulted from her pui chase of leplacement 
shaies) See Winter v American Automobile Ass >7, 149 So 2d 386, 388 (Fla Dist Ct App 
1963)(statmg that once defendant had established that plaintiff had the "right and 
opportunity" to mitigate damages, "the buiden of proof then shifted back to the plaintiff to 
establish its right to ignore the doctime of mitigation") The trial court theiefore committed 
legal eiToi when it found that Mi Covey had failed to meet his burden of piovmg a faihue 
to mitigate damages Since the flawed "immediate detiiment" aigument was the only 
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justification offered by the trial court in support of its conclusion that Ms. Covey did not fail 
to mitigate damages, its conclusion must be overturned as having been made without factual 
or legal support. See Brinkerhoffv. Schwendiman, 790 P.2d 587, 590 (Utah Ct. App. 
1990)(noting that after trial "the trial court has the responsibility to enter findings of fact and 
conclusions of law justifying its decision")(zmphcisis added); Anderson, 589 P.2d at 1216. 
Furthermore, the trial court's opinion suggests that anytime a plaintiff would incur any 
detriment if required to take action to mitigate damages, the plaintiff is excused from its 
entire duty to mitigate. This is an extreme and inequitable view which this Court should 
reject. Ms. Covey's duty was either to accept the cash equivalent in lieu of the securities, 
or buy the securities and then sue Mr. Covey for any other damages that might result. Her 
decision to do neither should not be rewarded with a windfall. 
4. The trial court erred in finding, confusingly, (1) that Ms. Covey held the 
Walker Lane Sale proceeds as collateral for further performance by Mr. 
Covey, (2) that the proceeds were uheld in escrow" by Ms. Covey, and (3) 
that there was no agreement surrounding Ms. Covey's receipt and 
retention of the proceeds. 
The trial court made three findings of fact which cannot be reconciled with one 
another, as they are contradictory. First, the trial court found that Ms. Covey consented to 
remove her Notice of Interest on the Walker Lane property, allowing the sale to proceed, 
"only if the net proceeds of the sale ... were to be left with her as a form of collateral and 
security" until Mr. Covey returned the Sears stock. (R. at 622; F. of F. 62; Add. 2.) Second, 
the trial court found that Ms. Covey "retained the net proceeds of the Walker Lane Sale as 
a form of escrow... ." (R. at 623; F. of F. 63; Add. 2.) Third, the trial court found that Ms. 
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Covey "did not retain the net sales proceeds of the Walker Lane [S]ale pursuant to any 
common understanding... ." (R. at 623; F. of F. 67; Add. 2.) 
The first finding depicts an agreement: Ms. Covey would remove her Notice of 
Interest and allow the Walker Lane Sale to proceed in exchange for the net proceeds of that 
sale. If the first finding is correct, the finding there was no common understanding* 
surrounding Ms. Covey's retention of the proceeds cannot be correct. The second finding, 
that the funds were held pursuant to an escrow agreement, camiot be reconciled with either 
of the other two—or with itself, as is discussed in greater detail below; and further, no 
evidence was presented at trial that an "escrow agreement" was ever reached by the parties. 
Finally, there is simply no substantial evidence, nor any logical explanation, mat can support 
the third finding that there was no agreement at all. 
These inherent inconsistencies notwithstanding, Utah law requires that appellants 
marshal the evidence in support of any findings of fact they challenge. Wilson Supply, Inc. 
v. Fradan Mfg. Corp., 2002 UT 94, ^21, 54 P.3d 1177). Pursuant to that requirement, the 
following facts were available in the record to support the trial court's findings (a) that Ms. 
Covey held the Walker Lane Sale proceeds as collateral for further performance by Mr. 
Covey, (b) that the proceeds were "held in escrow" by Ms. Covey, and (c) that there was no 
agreement surrounding Ms. Covey's receipt and retention of the proceeds: 
(1) the Agreement specifically identified one situation in which Mr. 
Covey might not be able to perform his promise to return the 
Sears stock; that situation was a margin call; 
(2) the option of recording the Warranty Deed "in lieu o f return of 
the Sears stock was not the exclusive remedy provided by the 
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Agreement; 
(3) Mr. Covey-did not return the Sears stock, and thus breached the 
Agreement; 
(4) the Seais stock was not sold as a result of a margin call, and Mr. 
Covey never explained how the Sears stock was lost or sold; 
(5) there was no separate written agreement surrounding the transfer 
by Mr. Covey of the more than $1.1 million in proceeds from 
the Walker Lane Sale; 
(6) Ms. Covey testified that she never intended to accept the Walker 
Lane Sale proceeds in lieu of the Sears stock, but only intended 
that the proceeds serve as collateral in case Mr. Covey failed to 
return the stock; 
(7) Ms. Covey testified that she consulted an attorney who indicated 
that any use of the Walker Lane Sale proceeds to purchase 
replacement shares would incur a tax consequence; 
(8) Ms. Covey testified that she offered to use the Walker Lane Sale 
proceeds to purchase replacement shares of Sears stock on the 
condition that Mr. Covey indemnify her for any tax 
consequences that might result; she testified that Mr. Covey 
refused. 
The evidence cited above, viewed in a light most favorable to Ms. Covey, is legally 
insufficient to justify the trial court's conclusions that Ms. Covey's retention of the Walker 
Lane Sale proceeds was covered, not by the written Loan Accommodation Agreement but 
by another, new, oral security agreement, by an escrow agreement, and by no agreement at 
all. As discussed above, these three findings are contradictory. Furthermore, none of them 
individually is supported by substantial evidence when considering such evidence in light 
of the contradictory provisions of the written Agreement and the evidence (e.g. in the 
testimony of Mr. Covey and actions by the parties) that the Walker Lane Sale proceeds were 
given to Ms. Covey in lieu of the Sears stock. 
As has been established, the trial court was mistaken to conclude that the Agreement 
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onhy contemplated one failure to leturn the Seais stock Under the Agieement, Ms Covey 
was allowed to take title to the Walkei Lane property "in lieu o f deliveiy of the Sears stock 
no mattei why the stock was not delivered The Agreement is the only wutten evidence of 
what the parties mtended to accomplish through the Walker Lane Sale, theiefore Ms 
Covey's retention of the proceeds of that sale should have been treated as presumptively 
pursuant to the Agieement and as havmg been retamed "in lieu o f the Sears shaies 
Evidence that the Walker Lane Sale proceeds weie given to Ms Covey in lieu of the 
Seais stock was available to the trial court as follows 
(1) the wutten Agreement, which anticipated Ms Covey's taking 
title to the home m lieu of delivery of the Seais stock upon any 
failuie to letum such stock (Add 3, f^ 5), 
(2) the fact that Ms Covey did in fact receive the pioceeds of the 
Walkei Lane Sale at a pomt m time when the Agreement had 
been breached, putting her m the position of having elected a 
lemedy, 
(3) the fact that the proceeds weie placed in Ms Covey's exclusive 
contiol, lathei than in the control of an impartial thnd party oi 
the control of both parties togethei (R at 1023, Ti at 179,1 14-
22), 
(4) the fact that the value of the pioceeds exceeded the value of the 
Seais stock by moie than $200,000 (Def 's Ex 31), covenng as 
well the additional debts and obligations owed by Mr Covey, 
(5) Mr Covey's testimony that he offeied the pioceeds mfull 
satisfaction of his obligations to Ms Covey undei the 
Agieement (R at 1024, Ti at 320, 1 17-18), 
(6) the fact that this lawsuit was not biought until November 20, 
1997 (R at 1), allowing Ms Covey six and a half years aftei the 
breach to see that the stock did in fact go up in value 
These pieces of evidence were ignored by the trial court because the trial court 
enoneously believed the Agieement had no application m a situation wheie the stock was 
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not leturned and no reason was given It therefore failed to weigh the wiitten language of 
the Agreement against the oral representations of Ms Covey when considermg why Mr 
Covey might have handed over more than $11 million m cash (1 e the Walker Lane Sale 
proceeds) Foi this and for the leasons that follow, each of these three findings of fact 
constitute clear error 
(a) The trial court's finding of a new, oral security agreement 
constitutes clear error. 
The trial court's first erroneous finding, that Ms Covey's retention of the Walker 
Lane Sale pioceeds was done pursuant to a new, oral secunty agieement, is clearly erroneous 
because it ignored the terms of the wiitten Loan Accommodation Agreement 
Misinterpreting the Agreement as never having anticipated any failure to leturn the securities 
othei than as a result of a margin call (which, of course, would mean that Ms Covey had no 
powei to lecord the Warranty Deed unless there was a margin call), the trial court found that 
Ms Covey's decision to receive the Walker Lane Sale proceeds into hei exclusive possession 
and control must have been done pursuant to some othei agieement But this approach 
ignoies the presumption that her acceptance of a cash equivalent for the value of her Sears 
stock meant she had elected her remedy under the contract 
Where a peison loans securities to another person, and the othei person fails to return 
the secunties, the lender's acceptance of a cash equivalent "piesumes a decision to sell" (See 
e g Stahl v United States, 441 F 2d 999, 1001 (D C Cn 1970)) oi, m this case, must be 
construed as piesumptively a decision to execute on the collateral "in lieu of any return of 
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the secunties The trial court's failuie to lequne Ms Covey to overcome any presumption 
that Mr Covey's return of a cash equivalent was meant to be "in lieu of the leturn of the 
secunties themselves therefoie constitutes an erroi of law which prejudiced Mr Covey Its 
failuie to recogmze any presumption at all constitutes clear error (if not an error of law), 
given the written Agieement's "in lieu o f provision, Mr Covey's willingness to hand over 
more than $11 million in cash, Ms Covey's acceptance of that cash (a "cash equivalent" at 
the very least), and the fact that the cash was deposited into an account controlled solely by 
Ms Covey What the trial court found was that Mi Covey was required to do the 
impossible buy leplacement shaies of Seais stock with money he could not spend The cash 
was controlled by Ms Covey, who lefused to purchase the shares, yet she demanded that Mi 
Covey purchase the shares 
(b) The trial court's finding that an escrow agreement existed 
constitutes clear error. 
The second enoneous finding, that Mi Covey's placement of the Walkei Lane Sale 
pioceeds in the exclusive possession and contiol of Ms Covey somehow constituted an 
escrow agreement, constitutes clear en or because "[i]t is essential to an esciow that the 
instiument 01 money be dehveied to a sti anger 01 thnd peison " 2 8 Am Jm 2d Escrow § 
21 (2002) It is well-established that "'[e]sciow,' by definition, means 'neutral ' independent 
from the parties to the transaction" 28 Am Jur 2d Escrow § 1 (2002) The Utah Court of 
Appeals has squarely held that an inteiested party's letention of transaction funds "negates 
the cstiangei oi third peison' aspect of an esciow " Hertz v Nordic Ltd, Inc , 761 P 2d 959, 
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962 (Utah Ct. App. 1988)(fmding that party holding funds "cannot be said to be a neutral 
party or a fiduciary" as to the other party, and holding that no escrow was created). Ms. 
Covey was certainly no "stranger or third person"; she was an interested party, and she alone 
had control of the account into which she deposited the proceeds of the Walker Lane Sale.. 
In Findings of Fact 73-74 (R. at 624-25), the trial court justifies its decision that Mr. 
Covey had "introduced insufficient evidence to carry his burden of proof that an accord and 
satisfaction existed" by finding that "no common agreement or understanding" was reached 
"in relation to the net sales proceeds of the Walker Lane Sale held in escrow." (Id. 
(emphasis added).) The court's confusion is obvious, since an "escrow" would require some 
"common agreement or understanding." Yet the court's position is that the funds were held 
in escrow pursuant to no common understanding. This impossible scenario constitutes clear* 
error. 
Since the court relied on this clearly erroneous "escrow" characterization to conclude 
that Mr. Covey's evidence was insufficient to show an accord and satisfaction, the court's 
conclusion cannot stand and must be reversed. 
(c) The trial court's finding that there was no agreement constitutes 
clear error. 
The trial court's finding that Ms. Covey "did not retain the net sales proceeds of the 
Walker Lane [S]ale pursuant to any common understanding," is clearly erroneous because 
it belies the court's first two erroneous findings, contradicts the tenns of the written 
Agreement, is not supported by substantial evidence when marshaled, and makes no logical 
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sense Mr Covey's willingness to give up $1 1 million must have been done puisuant to 
some kind of agreement, the most obvious possible agieement puisuant to which he might 
have been acting would have been the wntten Loan Accommodation Agreement Yet the 
tiial court found that he gave up more than $1 1 million m cash pursuant to no agieement at 
all 
As previously stated, U R C P 52(a) lequires reveisal when trial courts acting as 
factfinder fail to "cleaily mdicate the mmd of the court" oi to "lesolve all issues of material 
fact necessary to justify the conclusions of law and judgment enteied thereon " Parks v 
Ziom First Nat 7 Bank, 673 P 2d 590, 601 (Utah 1983) In othei woids, a trial court must 
"indicate that theie is a logical and legal basis foi its ultimate conclusions, setting forth the 
basic facts which show why that conclusion is justified " Myers v Myers, 768 P 2d 979, 983 
(Utah Ct App 1989) The trial court's confused and contradictory fmdmgs of fact that Ms 
Covey's teceipt of the Walker Lane Sale proceeds generated a new, oial security agreement, 
that it created an esciow agreement, and that it was associated with no agreement at all do 
not constitute "a logical and legal basis for its ultimate conclusions " Myers v Myers, 768 
P 2d 979, 983 (Utah Ct App 1989) These findings are legally insufficient to justify the 
trial court's Conclusions of Law 
5. The trial court abused its discretion in ordering specific performance. 
The tiial court found that specific peiformance was an appiopnate lemedy for Mr 
Covey's breach of the Agieement, even though Ms Covey had complete contiol of the 
Walkei Lane Sale proceeds Mi Covey testified that he dnected Ms Covey to buy 
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replacement shares of Sears stock with those proceeds. (R. at 1024; Tr.at 307-08.) If the 
court below believed Ms. Covey was acting as an escrow agent, one would presume the court 
would have noted some kind of duty owed by her to follow his instructions. Nevertheless, 
in finding that specific performance was appropriate, the trial court ignored the obviously 
unfair position that Ms. Covey was in with regards to her remedy: having possession and 
control over the Walker Lane proceeds (which prevented Mr. Covey from being able to buy 
replacement shares) and being able (since she succeeded at trial) to wait and see whether the 
price of Sears stock went up or down before filing a lawsuit. 
Investors are not permitted to profit from a delay in seeking a claim in order to 
determine whether the investment will prove to be unprofitable. Sterlin v. Biomune Systems, 
Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 1163, 1173 (D. Utah 2000). The securities laws, for example, were 
made "to protect the innocent investor, not one who loses his innocence and then waits to 
see how his investment turns out before he decides to invoke the provisions of the 
[Securities] Act [of 1933]." Anixterv. Home-Stake Prod Co.,977F.2d 1549, 1552 (10thCir. 
1992). This Court accepted this general idea when it stated of the doctrine of laches that 
"equity aids the vigilant, not those who slumber on their rights." Nilson-Newey & Co. v. 
Utah Resources Int 7, 905 P.2d 312, 314 (Utah Ct. App. 1995)(internal quotations omitted). 
It was entirely inappropriate for the trial court to order specific performance because 
(1) Ms. Covey was able to wait from 1991 until 1997 to "see how [her] investment turn[ed] 
out" (Anixter, 977 F.2d at 1552); and (2) judgment was not rendered imtil August of 2001, 
after four more years of growth—during which time, at any time, Ms. Covey could have 
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decided not to further pursue the lawsuit based on the market activity of Sears stock Thus, 
not only was the tiial court's older of specific performance an abuse of discretion, even a 
damages equivalent would have rewarded Ms Covey for hei "wait and see" approach 
towards her cause of action 
Damages m secunties actions aie generally calculated from the tune at which the 
cause of action accrued In this case the cause of action accrued on or about Octobei 19, 
1991, thirty days after the Agreement was signed As of Octobei 31, 1991, the Sears stock 
was worth $134,543 88 (Def 'sEx 32) OnNovember5, 1996, one week after the Walkei 
Lane Sale (at which time Ms Covey had received and had full control ovei all of hei 
proceeds from the Sale), the Sears stock was worth $887,268 25 (Def's Ex 31) At the 
time of trial (l e January, 2001) it was worth $1,722,220 38 (PI 's Ex 29 ) Clearly Ms 
Covey enjoyed a very enviable position, havmg been mappropilately allowed to benefit by 
letammg the Walkei Lane Sale proceeds if the stock went down m value, or foicmg Mi 
Covey to leplace hei shaies if the stock went up Mr Covey, on the othei hand, was placed 
in a Catch-22, being commanded to puichase replacement shares without being given access 
to the funds necessaiy to make the purchase 
In a cause of action foi bieach of contiact mvolvmg securities, the value of the 
secunties must be measuied from the time of bieach As one court has put it, "the damage 
awaid lesulting from a bieach of an agieement to pmchase secunties is the diffeience 
between the contract price and the fair market value of the asset at the time of bieach, not 
the difference between the contiact puce and the value of the shaies sometime subsequent 
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to the breach." Sharma v. Skaarup Ship Management Corp., 916 F.2d 820, 825 (2nd Cir. 
1990). 
Other courts dealing with this issue have been more gracious to the damaged party, 
awarding damages based on the highest market price during a "reasonable time" after breach; 
the reason for this approach is that the market risk (i.e. that the price will rise) should be 
assumed by the party in breach, and this approach gives the damaged party a reasonable 
time—a month, for example—in which to replace the stock. See e.g. Payne v. Wood, 62 
F.3d 1418 (6th Cir. 1995); Rauserv. LTVElectrosystems, Inc., 437 F.2d 800 (7th Cir. 1971). 
As one court approached it in the context of a failure to deliver stock shares, "the proper 
measure of the damages caused by [a person's] failure to deliver the stock was the highest 
value which the stock had attained during a reasonable time after the defendant's breach." 
Butterfieldv. Metal Flow Corp., 462 N.W.2d 815, 819 (Mich. App. 1990). 
In this case, ordering specific performance was no different from ordering Mr. Covey 
to pay damages based on the value of the stock several years after the breach; this type of 
damage award would not be allowed even under the more lenient "reasonable time" 
approach. 
6. The trial court erred in concluding that Mr. Covey should be personally 
liable for the $55,000.00 in funds that were transferred out of Ms. Covey's 
account at Covey & Co. 
When challenging a trial court's decision to pierce the corporate veil, an appellant 
must show that the decision is not supported by substantial evidence. Colman v. Colman, 
743 P.2d 782, 787 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). However, Mr. Covey alleges not only that there 
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was no substantial evidence to support the trial court5 s findings, but that there was no finding 
at all finding that the appropriate factors had been met to justify piercing the corporate veil 
of Covey & Co. As previously stated, U.R.C.P. 52(a) requires reversal when trial courts 
acting as factfinders fail to "clearly indicate the mind of the court" or to "resolve all issues 
of material fact necessary to justify the conclusions of law and judgment entered thereon." 
Parks, 673 P.2d at 601; Anderson, 589 P.2d at 1216. 
The trial court found that $100,000 from Ms. Covey's account had been transferred' 
into an internal error account at Covey & Co.; later, $50,338.92 was transferred back to Ms. 
Covey. (R. at 618-19; F. of F. 37-41; Add. 2.) This was found to have damaged Ms. Covey 
in the amount of $55,484.15. (R. at 619; F. of F. 40; Add. 2.) The court concluded Mr. 
Covey was responsible for these transfers as the only person at Covey & Co. authorized to 
make transactions in Ms. Covey's account (R. at 618; F. of F. 33-34; Add. 2), and that these 
transfers violated fiduciary duties owed to Ms. Covey and that he "is personally and 
individually liable" for the loss of. (R. at 629-30; C. of L. 11-14.) 
This Court has stated that "[o]rdinarily, a corporation is regarded as a separate and 
distinct legal entity from its stockholders." Salt Lake City Corp. v. James Constructors, Inc., 
761 P.2d 42, 45 (Utah Ct. App. 1988)(citation omitted). This is true even where there is only 
one stockholder. Colman v. Colmcm, 743 P.2d 782, 786 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). In order to 
justify piercing the corporate veil, a trial court must find that 
(1) there was such a unity of interest and ownership that the separate 
personalities of the corporation and the individual no longer exist, viz., the 
corporation is, in fact, the alter ego of one or a few individuals; and (2) the 
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observance of the corporate form would sanction a fraud, promote injustice, 
or an inequitable result would follow. 
Paria Group v. Westchester Inv. Partners, Ltd., 2000 UT App 19, 2000 WL 33249402, *l 
(citing James Constructors, Inc., 761 P.2d at 46-47). 
The trial court in this case did not enter any finding that "there was such a unity of 
interest and ownership [i.e. between Mr. Covey and Covey & Co.] that the separate 
personalities of the corporation and the individual no longer exist." James Constructors, 
Inc., 761 P.2d at 46-47. In fact, the trial court did not even find that the corporate veil should 
be pierced; it simply concluded that Mr. Covey was personally liable for the $55,484.15 in-
damages suffered by Ms. Covey as a result of the unauthorized transfers. (R. at 619; F. of 
F. 43; Add. 2.) Without these findings, there is no substantial justification for the trial 
court's conclusion of law that Mr. Covey is personally liable for the missing funds. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Mr. Covey respectfully asks this Court for an order (1) 
remanding this case for retrial in order to enforce Mr. Covey's right to jury trial; (2) 
declaring that the Loan Accommodation Agreement anticipated that any failure to return the 
Sears stock would trigger the remedial provisions of paragraph 5; (3) reversing the trial 
court's legal determination that a tax consequence would have occurred had Ms. Covey used * 
the Walker Lane Sale proceeds to repurchase Sears shares; (4) reversing the trial court's 
contradictory factual findings that Ms. Covey's retention of the Walker Lane Sale proceeds 
was done pursuant to a new security agreement, an escrow agreement, and no agreement, and 
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ordering on remand that a presumption existed that Mr. Covey's conveyance of such 
proceeds was done pursuant to the written Agreement; (5) finding the trial court's order of 
specific performance to be an abuse of discretion and ordering damages, if any, to be 
calculated based on the stock price at the date of breach; and (6) reversing the trial court's 
conclusion that Mr. Covey is personally liable for Covey & Co.'s unauthorized transfers 
from and to Ms. Covey's personal stock account. 
DATED this J§_ day of January, 2003. 
COHNE RAPPAPORT & SEGAL, P.C. 
Larry R^e l l e r 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing to be mailed, 
by first class U.S. postage prepaid, this IbW day of OT\/AA\frK_Mw 2003, to: 
Patrick A. Shea 
James E. Magleby 
Ballard, Spahr, Andrews & IngersoU 
One Utah Center, Suite 600 
201 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2221 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
NOEL MILNER COVEY, an individual, 
Plaintiff, 
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ALMON MILNER COVEY, an individual, 
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JUDGMENT 
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1. Noel Milner Covey, acting as agent for Almon Milner Covey, shall utilize the 
proceeds in the Dean Witter money market account, which constitute the proceeds of the Walker 
Lane sale, and purchase within 10 business days after January 17, 2001, as Almon Milner 
Covey's agent and/or in his name, replacement shares of the Sears Stock and its progeny, for 
delivery to herself to restore her to the same position she would have been in if Almon Milner 
Covey had returned the Sears Stock in a timely manner and made her whole; Noel Milner Covey 
shall cause these purchases first to be of Morgan Stanley/Dean Witter and Allstate stock. If there 
are sufficient proceeds to purchase all necessary shares of Morgan Stanley/Dean Witter and 
Allstate stock, then Noel Milner Covey shall next purchase as many replacement shares of Sears 
Stock as possible. Noel Milner Covey shall then inform Almon Milner Covey, through her 
attorneys, of the remaining shares that need to be purchased; Almon Milner Covey shall then 
repurchase these shares using his own funds and shall deliver confirmation of that purchase to 
Noel Milner Covey within 50 calendar days of receiving notice from Noel Milner Covey of the 
shortfall which he needs to purchase. The Court retains jurisdiction of this matter to see that its 
Orders are carried out and for any other further relief needed. 
/ 
2. The Court orders judgment against Almon Milner Covey for damages to Noel 
Milner Covey for losses in her Covey & Co. stock account in the amount of $55,484.15 
principal, with interest from and after July 29, 1993 at 10% through January 19, 2001, for a total 
amount of $96,956.20, with a per diem of $15.20 until Judgment is entered, for a total Judgment 
amount of $99,981,00. This amount shall accrue interest at the post judgment interest rate 
allowed by law. 
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3. The Court enters judgment against Almon Milner Covey on the $41,000 
Promissory Note, with interest from and after January 15, 1997 at 12.5% to January 19, 2001 of 
$20,556.00, for a total amount of $61,556.00 as of January 19, 2001, with a per diem of $14.24 
until Judgment is entered, for a total Judgment amount of $64,389.76. This amount shall bear 
interest at the post judgment rate of 12.5% pursuant to the terms of the Promissory Note. 
4. The Court enters judgment against Almon Milner Covey for $11,500 in principal 
on the July 19, 1996 Note, with accrued interest at the rate of 25% from and after July 23, 1996 
through January 19, 2001 of $12,886.53, for a total amount of $24,386.53 with a per diem until 
Judgment is entered of $7.99, for a total Judgment amount of $25,976.54. This amount shall 
accrue interest at the post judgment interest rate of 25% pursuant to the terms of the Promissory 
Note. 
/ 
5. The Court enters judgment against Almon Milner Covey individually for $1,000 
principal from the Loan Accommodation Agreement, with 12.5% interest from and after October 
20, 1991 of $1,156.47, for a total amount to January 19, 2001 of $2,156.47, with a per diem 
until Judgment is entered of $.35, for a total Judgment amount of $2,226.12. This amount shall 
accrue interest at the post judgment interest rate of 12.5% pursuant to the Loan Accommodation 
Agreement. 
/ 
6. The Court enters judgment against Almon Milner Covey for $157,073.08 in 
dividends owed on the Sears Stock and its progeny, and for $64,248.35 in interest owed on those 
dividends at 10% from and after the day they were due to January 19, 2001, for a total amount 
owed as of January 19, 2001, of $221,321.43, with a per diem until Judgment is entered of 
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$43.63, for a total Judgment amount of $230,003.80. This amount shall accrue interest at the 
post judgment interest rate allowed by law. 
7. The Court enters judgment against Almon Milner Covey for $9,160 from and after 
January 8, 1997 through January 19, 2001, with 10% interest of $3,693.96, for a total amount of 
$13,359.42, with a per diem until Judgment is entered of $2.54, for a total Judgment amount of 
$13,356.88. This amount shall accrue interest at the post judgment rate allowed by law. 
8. The Court enters judgment against Almon Milner Covey for $5,000 from and after 
January 8, 1997, at 10% interest through January 19, 2001 of $2,028.92, for a total amount of 
$7,028.92, with a per diem until Judgment is entered of $1.39, for a total Judgment amount of 
$7,305.53. This amount shall accrue interest at the post judgment rate allowed by law. 
9. The Plaintiff has prevailed in this matter and therefore the Court adjudges that the 
Plaintiff is entitled to an award of attorneys' fees and costs. The Court reserves the issue of the 
amount of an award of attorneys' fees and costs for further motion by the Plaintiff. 
Attorney for Almon Milner Covey 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
On this / day of August, 2001, I hereby caused to be hand delivered, a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing JUDGMENT to the following: 
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525 East 100 South, Fifth Floor 
P.O. Box 11008 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
NOEL MILNER COVEY, an individual, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ALMON MILNER COVEY, an individual, 
Defendant. 
ALMON MILNER COVEY, an individual, 
Third Party Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DAVID E. NELSON, 
Third Party Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT, AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Case No. 970908277 
Judge David S. Young 
The Court having held a bench trial in this matter on January 16 and 17, 2001, having 
received and considered the testimony and other evidentiary materials, and having heard closing 
arguments, and after considering the applicable law, hereby makes and enters the following 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law pursuant to Rule 52(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
I. FINDINGS OF FACT. 
A. Identification of the Parties. 
1. Noel Milner Covey, an individual, is the younger sister of Almon Milner Covey. 
2. At all times from September 19, 1991 through 1993, Almon Milner Covey was the 
owner of the brokerage firm Covey & Co., a securities principal in Covey & Co., an officer of 
Covey & Co, a stockbroker of Covey & Co., Noel Milner Covey's stockbroker at Covey & Co. 
and Noel Milner Covey's older brother. Covey & Co. was a duly authorized and registered 
corporation in good standing under Utah law between September 1991 through 1993. 
3. Almon Milner Covey was Noel Milner Covey's stockbroker on her stock account 
at Covey & Co. from 1969 through late 1993, when Covey & Co. closed. 
B. Background. 
4. In September, 1991, Almon Milner Covey asked Noel Milner Covey to loan him 
7,219 shares of Sears & Roebuck ("Sears") Stock. 
5. Noel Milner Covey agreed to the request, if a written agreement could be entered 
between the parties concerning the loan of the Sears Stock. 
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6. Noel Milner Covey did not intend to transfer ownership of the Sears Stock to 
Almon Milner Covey. She always wanted the Sears Stock returned by Almon Milner Covey, in 
part, to avoid capital gains taxes. 
C. The Loan Accommodation Agreement. 
7. On September 19, 1991, Noel Milner Covey, individually, and Almon Milner 
Covey, individually, executed a written agreement titled Loan Accommodation Agreement. 
8. The Loan Accommodation Agreement, admitted into evidence as Exhibit " 1 " in 
this case, is clear and unambiguous. 
9. Under the Loan Accommodation Agreement, Noel Milner Covey loaned the 7,219 
shares of Sears Stock to Almon Milner Covey on September 19, 1991. 
10. Paragraph 4 of the Loan Accommodation Agreement required that Almon Milner 
Covey return the Sears Stock within 30 days. 
11. Paragraph 1 of the Loan Accommodation Agreement required that ownership of 
the Sears Stock loaned to Almon Milner Covey not be transferred out of Noel Milner Covey's 
name unless Covey & Co. executed on the Sears Stock to cover a required margin in Almon 
Milner Covey's personal margin account at Covey & Co. under the terms of an appropriate 
pledge agreement and under the requirements of Almon Milner Covey's margin account at Covey 
&Co. 
12. In the event that a sale of the Sears Stock occurred due to Covey & Co.'s 
execution on the Sears Stock to cover the margin requirements in Almon Milner Covey's margin 
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account, paragraph 1 of the Loan Accommodation Agreement granted Noel Milner Covey all of 
the remedies set forth in the Loan Accommodation Agreement. 
13. Simultaneously with the execution of the Loan Accommodation Agreement, 
Almon Milner Covey delivered to Noel Milner Covey, as security a "Warranty Deed" and 
"Notice of Interest in Real Property" covering certain real property owned by Almon Milner 
Covey in Holladay, Utah, hereinafter referred to as the "Walker Lane" property. 
14. Under paragraphs 5 and 6 of the Loan Accommodation Agreement, in the event 
that the Sears Stock was executed on by Covey & Co. to cover margin requirements in Almon 
Milner Covey's margin account, Noel Milner Covey was entitled to, but not required to, record 
the Warranty Deed. 
15. Under paragraphs 5 and 6 of the Loan Accommodation Agreement, the option of 
recording the Warranty Deed was not the exclusive remedy provided by the Loan 
Accommodation Agreement for a failure to return the Sears Stock. 
16. It was always anticipated by the parties that the Sears Stock would be returned to 
Noel Milner Covey. 
17. The Court finds that the only exception to the return of the Sears Stock was in the 
event that the stock was called upon by Covey & Co. to satisfy a required margin in accordance 
with the terms of Almon Milner Covey's personal margin account agreement at Covey & Co. 
18. Under paragraph 6 of the Loan Accommodation Agreement, no failure or delay by 
Noel Milner Covey in exercising any right, power or remedy under the Loan Accommodation 
Agreement or under any of the documents executed and delivered in connection with the Loan 
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Accommodation Agreement, could operate as a waiver, nor could her exercise of any right, 
power or remedy preclude any other or farther exercise of any other right, power or remedy 
under the Loan Accommodation Agreement. 
D. Sale of the Sears Stock. 
19. Almon Milner Covey had the primary duty for performance under the Loan 
Accommodation Agreement; his primary duty of performance included the duty to return or 
restore the Sears Stock and its progeny to Noel Milner Covey. 
20. After the signing of the Loan Accommodation Agreement, there was never a 
margin call in Almon Milner Covey's margin account at Covey & Co. 
21. Covey & Co. never executed on the Sears Stock to cover or satisfy the required 
margin, or any other requirement, in Almon Milner Covey's account at Covey & Co. 
22. Almon Milner Covey failed to timely return the Sears stock and, in fact, never 
returned the Sears Stock to Noel Milner Covey. 
23. After the delivery of the Sears Stock to him under the Loan Accommodation 
Agreement, ownership of the Sears Stock was transferred through a sale and Almon Covey is 
charged with the responsibility of that sale occurring. 
24. There was conflicting evidence regarding the cause of "sale" of the Sears Stock 
and when and how it occurred. The Court does not resolve these conflicts but finds that it was 
undisputed that the sale of the Sears Stock did not occur as a result of any execution on the Sears 
Stock by Covey & Co. to cover the required margin in Almon Milner Covey's margin account at 
Covey & Co. 
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25. Noel Milner Covey was neither aware of, nor did she consent to, the sale of the 
Sears Stock. 
26. The sale of the Sears Stock constituted a breach of the Loan Accommodation 
Agreement by Almon Milner Covey. 
27. The Sears Stock eventually split into shares of Morgan Stanley/Dean Witter and 
Allstate. The Sears Stock, the Morgan Stanley/Dean Witter stock and the Allstate stock, and all 
dividends owed on those stocks, are hereinafter referred to as the "Sears Stock and its progeny". 
28. Almon Milner Covey has been, and remains, obligated to return the Sears Stock, 
and its progeny, to Noel Milner Covey since 30 days after the execution of the Loan 
Accommodation Agreement. 
29. Noel Milner Covey took the position with Almon Milner Covey that the Sears 
Stock and its progeny would need to be replaced and returned to her by Almon Milner Covey, or 
by Noel Milner Covey acting as his agent, in order to avoid capital gains tax to her. 
30. Noel Milner Covey subsequently engaged attorney William Vogel to contact 
Almon Milner Covey and arrange for terms and conditions on which the Sears Stock and its 
progeny would be returned, and to resolve other matters between the parties. 
31. Almon Milner Covey was and remains obligated to restore Noel Milner Covey to 
the same position she would have been in had he timely returned the 7,219 shares of Sears stock 
and its progeny, that is, to make her whole, including reimbursement, with interest, of all accrued 
dividends. 
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E. Dividends. 
32. As of January 19, 2001, the amount of dividends lost by Noel Milner Covey 
attributable to the Sears Stock and its progeny and owed by Almon Milner Covey to Noel Milner 
Covey was $157,073.08, plus 10% prejudgment interest of $64,248.35, for a total amount owed 
of $221,321.43, with a per diem of $44.63 until Judgment is entered. 
F. Noel Milner Covey's Covey & Co. Stock Account. 
33. As of September 30, 1992, Almon Milner Covey was the only stockbroker 
authorized to engage in activity or make transactions in Noel Milner Covey's account at Covey & 
Co. 
34. Almon Milner Covey acted in a fiduciary capacity as Noel Milner Covey's 
stockbroker, and a fiduciary relationship existed between them. 
35. On September 30, 1992, Noel Milner Covey's stock account at Covey & Co. was 
converted, without her permission or knowledge, from a cash account to a margin account. 
36. Noel Milner Covey was unaware and never authorized the conversion of her cash 
account to a margin account. 
37. On September 30, 1992, after Noel Milner Covey's account had been converted to 
a margin account, $100,000 was misappropriated from her account and transferred to Almon 
Milner Covey's internal error account at Covey & Co. 
38. Noel Milner Covey was not aware of, and did not authorize, the $100,000 
misappropriation from her account to Almon Milner Covey's internal error account at Covey & 
Co. 
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39. By July 29, 1993, the unauthorized, improper and wrongful charges to Noel 
Milner Covey's account at Covey & Co., including margin interest and custodial fees, totaled at 
least $105,824.07. On July 29, 1993, $50,338.92 was transferred from Almon Milner Covey's 
internal account at Covey & Co. back to Noel Milner Covey's account at Covey & Co. 
40. As of July 29, 1993, Noel Milner Covey's damages and losses as a result of the 
unauthorized creation of a margin account in her name in Covey & Co., and as a result of the 
$100,000 misappropriated from her account and transferred to Almon Milner Covey's internal 
error account, was at least $55,484.15. 
41. The unauthorized creation of a margin account in Noel Milner Covey's name, and 
the unauthorized misappropriation and transfer of $100,000 from that account to Almon Milner 
Covey's internal account at Covey & Co., constitute a breach of Almon Milner Covey's personal 
fiduciary duties to Noel Milner Covey. 
42. Almon Milner Covey is personally liable for his breach of fiduciary duty to Noel 
Milner Covey. 
43. As of July 29, 1993, Almon Milner Covey owed Noel Milner Covey the principal 
sum of $55,484.15 for losses in her account at Covey & Co., with interest at the rate of 10% 
from and after July 29 to January 19, 2001, totaling $44,471.05, for a total amount owed of 
$96,956.20 as of January 19, 2001, with a per diem of $15.20 until Judgment is entered. 
G. The $11,500 Promissory Note. 
44. On or prior to July 19, 1996, Noel Milner Covey loaned Almon Milner Covey 
$11,500. 
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45. On July 19, 1996, Almon Milner Covey executed a hand-written Promissory Note 
(the "July 19, 1996 Promissory Note") to Noel Milner Covey, entered into evidence as Exhibit 
"19", memorializing the $11,500 loan. 
46. In the July 19, 1996 Promissory Note, Almon Milner Covey promised to repay 
$11,500 to Noel Milner Covey by July 26, 1996, and if not paid by that date, 25% interest to 
accrue until paid, and attorneys' fees incurred in collection. 
47. Almon Milner Covey failed to repay any portion of the July 19, 1996 $11,500 
Promissory Note. 
48. Under the July 19, 1996 $11,500 Promissory Note, Almon Milner Covey owes to 
Noel Milner Covey as of January 19, 2001, the principal sum of $11,500, with 25% interest, as 
provided by the Promissory Note from and after July 26, 1996, of $12,886.53 as of January 19, 
2001, for a total amount owed as of January 19, 2001, of $24,386.53, with a per diem of $7.99 
until Judgment is entered. 
H. The $14,160 Loan. 
49. On January 7, 1997, Almon Milner Covey borrowed $5,000 from Noel Milner 
Covey represented by Check No. 3629, entered into evidence as Exhibit 21 dated December 29, 
1996 and deposited in his account on January 8, 1997. 
50. On January 8, 1997, at Almon Milner Covey's request and direction, Noel Milner 
Covey purchased a cashiers check for $9,160 payable to Marilyn S. Covey, Almon Covey's ex-
wife. 
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51. Noel Milner Covey and Almon Milner Covey considered the $9,160 cashiers 
check to Marilyn S. Covey, Almon Milner Covey's wife, as a loan from Noel Milner Covey to 
Almon Milner Covey. 
52. Almon Milner Covey has not repaid the two loans represented by the $5,000 
Check No. 3629 and the $9,160 cashiers check. 
53. There is due and owing by Almon Milner Covey to Noel Milner Covey as of 
January 19, 2001, the principal sum of $9,160.00 with accrued interest of $3,693.96, for a total 
amount of $12,853.96 with a per diem until Judgment is entered of $2.54. 
54. There is due and owing by Almon Milner Covey to Noel Milner Covey as of 
January 19, 2001, the principal sum of $5,000.00, with accrued interest through January 19, 2001 
of $2,028.92, for a total amount of $7,028.92, for the per diem until Judgment is entered of 
$1.39. 
I. The $41,000 Promissory Note. 
55. For valuable consideration, on or about December 31, 1996, Almon Milner Covey 
executed Exhibit 18, a Promissory Note to Noel Milner Covey for $41,000 with interest at the 
rate of 12.5% per annum until paid, payable in full January 15, 1997. 
56. Almon Milner Covey failed to repay any portion of that Note. 
57. There is due and owing to Noel Milner Covey by Almon Milner Covey as of 
January 19, 2001, the principal sum of $41,000, plus interest to January 19, 2001, at the rate of 
12.5% per annum as provided in the Promissory Note of $20,556.00, for a total amount owed as 
of January 19, 2001 of $61,556.00, with a per diem of $14.24 until Judgement is entered. 
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J. The $1,000 Loan. 
58. In the Loan Accommodation Agreement, Almon Milner Covey admitted and 
reaffirmed that he owed Noel Milner Covey $36,000 on a previous obligation. 
59. Almon Milner Covey failed to repay $1,000 of that $36,000 previous obligation. 
60. Almon Milner Covey owes Noel Milner Covey the principal sum of $1,000, with 
12.5% interest from and after October 20, 1991 to January 19, 2001 of $1,156.47, for a total 
amount owed to Noel Milner Covey as of January 19, 2001, of $2,156,47, with a per diem of 
$.35 until Judgment is entered. 
K. Defenses. 
61. On October 28, 1996, Almon Milner Covey sold the Walker Lane Property (the 
"Walker Lane Sale"). The Walker Lane Sale was closed by Almon Milner Covey through 
Associated Title Company. The Walker Lane Sale generated gross proceeds of approximately 
$1,862,500.00, and net proceeds, after payments to Almon Milner Covey's other creditors and 
lienholders, of $1,118,827.05. 
62. Noel Milner Covey consented to remove her Notice of Interest on the Walker Lane 
property so that the Walker Lane Sale could proceed but only if the net proceeds of the sale of the 
Walker Lane property were to be left with her as a form of collateral and security for Almon's 
duty to return the Sears Stock and restore her to the position she would have been in had he 
timely returned the Sears Stock. 
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63. Noel Milner Covey retained the net proceeds of the Walker Lane Sale as a form of 
escrow, collateral and security for Almon Milner Covey's obligations to repurchase and restore 
the Sears Stock and its progeny, and for obligations of Almon Milner Covey to her. 
64. Noel Milner Covey insisted prior to and after the Walker Lane Sale that the parties 
meet again with her attorney, William Vogel, Esq., to determine the amounts due and methods 
for paying or satisfying Almon Milner Covey's obligations to her, including his obligation to 
return the Sears Stock and its progeny. 
65. Noel Milner Covey insisted prior to and after the Walker Lane Sale that the parties 
meet with their attorney, William Vogel, Esq., to enter a written agreement that would resolve all 
issues. No such written agreement was ever executed between the parties. 
66. Noel Milner Covey never agreed to accept the net proceeds from the Walker Lane 
sale as satisfaction of any of Almon Milner Covey's obligations to her. 
67. Noel Milner Covey did not retain the net sales proceeds of the Walker Lane sale 
pursuant to any common understanding, or any accord and satisfaction, with Almon Milner 
Covey and retain the net sales proceeds as satisfaction of any of Almon Milner Covey's debts. 
68. Had Noel Milner Covey utilized the Walker Lane Sales proceeds to purchase 
replacement shares of the Sears Stock, she would have incurred an immediate detriment in the 
form of capital gains taxes which she would not have occurred had Almon Milner Covey returned 
the Sears Stock and its progeny timely. 
69. At Almon Milner Covey's direction, Noel Milner Covey deposited the net 
proceeds of the Walker Lane sale in a money market account. 
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70. Almon Milner Covey raised the affirmative defense and counterclaim of accord 
and satisfaction, claiming that he had reached an agreement with his sister, Noel Milner Covey, 
prior to the Walker Lane sale that she would accept the net proceeds of the Walker Lane sale in 
complete satisfaction of all of his outstanding debts to her and of all his outstanding obligations to 
return the Sears Stock plus all of its progeny to her and that she would utilize the net sales 
proceeds to repurchase the Sears Stock herself, even though she would incur a substantial tax 
penalty. The Court finds that no such agreement or accord and satisfaction occurred. 
71. Noel Milner Covey testified repeatedly that she had never entered or reached any 
such agreement or understanding with her brother. The Court found Noel Milner Covey's 
testimony on this issue to be credible and believable. 
72. Prior to and after the Walker Lane sale, both parties were continually disputing the 
amount to be paid by Almon Milner Covey to Noel Milner Covey, the method and manner of the 
repurchase and return of the Sears Stock, whether Almon Milner Covey was to repurchase the 
Sears Stock and return it in certificate form, whether the stock was to be purchased by Noel 
Milner Covey, and the amount of other obligations owed by Almon Milner Covey to Noel Milner 
Covey. 
73. There was no common agreement or understanding reached between Noel Milner 
Covey and Almon Milner Covey at any time in relation to recording the Warranty Deed, in 
relation to the net sales proceeds of the Walker Lane sale held in escrow, in relation to the 
repurchase of the Sears Stock and its progeny, or in relation to the total amount due and owing by 
Almon Milner Covey to Noel Milner Covey that would constitute the basis for an accord. 
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74. Almon Milner Covey introduced insufficient evidence to carry his burden of proof 
that an accord and satisfaction existed. 
75. Noel Milner Covey's receipt of the net sales proceeds from Walker Lane did not 
constitute an election of remedies or an accord. Instead, the proceeds were retained by Noel 
Milner Covey as collateral for Almon Milner Covey's performance of his obligation to restore her 
Sears Stock. 
76. Almon Milner Covey did not carry his burden of proof that the Noel Milner Covey 
failed to mitigate damages. 
77. Noel Milner Covey never elected to record the Warranty Deed as a remedy for 
Almon Milner Covey's failure to return the Sears Stock. 
78. Almon Milner Covey failed to carry his burden of proof that Noel Milner Covey 
elected a remedy. 
79. The Court finds injustice, equity, good conscience, and using its discretion, that a 
Decree of Specific Performance is warranted in this case, as set forth in the Judgment. 
80. Almon Milner Covey never requested or demanded that the Warranty Deed be 
recorded by Noel Milner Covey. 
81. Noel Milner Covey never converted any sums due and owing to or belonging to 
Almon Milner Covey. 
82. Noel Milner Covey did not fail to mitigate her damages. 
83. Almon Milner Covey introduced no evidence of a lack or failure of consideration. 
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84. Almon Milner Covey failed to carry his burden of proof on the issues of waiver 
and set off. The Court finds no waiver by Noel Milner Covey of any rights under the Loan 
Accommodation Agreement, or of any other rights. 
85. Almon Milner Covey failed to carry his burden of proof on mitigation of damages 
that Noel Milner Covey had unreasonably delayed in bringing this action. The Court finds no 
unreasonable delay by Noel Milner Covey in bringing this action. 
86. The Court finds no evidence of any "unclean hands" by Noel Milner Covey. 
87. Covey & Co. is not an indispensable party to this action. The Court finds that it 
can grant full relief to all parties without the joinder of Covey & Co. 
88. The headings used in these Findings of Fact are for the convenience of the Court 
and the parties and have no binding effect. 
89. The Plaintiff moved for an award of attorneys' fees and presented evidence of 
attorneys' fees at trial. The Court, however, determined that the amount of attorneys' to be 
awarded would be reserved to be determined by post trial proceedings. Accordingly, the Court 
reserves the amount of attorneys' fees to be determined by further motion of the Plaintiff. 
90. If any of these Findings of Facts are found to be Conclusions of Law, they are 
deemed incorporated by reference in the Conclusions of Law; to the extent any of the Conclusions 
of Law are deemed to be Findings of Fact, they are incorporated by reference in the Findings of 
Fact. 
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II. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW. 
1. Contract interpretation begins with an examination of the agreement itself to 
determine the intent of the parties. Home Sav. & Loan v. Aetna Cas. & Sur., 817 P.2d 341, 
347 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). The agreement should be interpreted in a manner to harmonize all 
of its provisions and terms. Id. Additionally, a contract should be read as a whole in an 
attempt to harmonize and give effect to all of the contract provisions. Elm, Inc. v. M.T. 
Enter., Inc., 968 P.2d 861, 863 (Utah Ct. App. 1998)(ordinary rules of contract construction 
dictate that if a contract's terms are clear and unambiguous, the court must construe the writing 
according to its plain and ordinary meeting). The issue of whether a contract provision is 
ambiguous is a question of law for the court. Home Sav. & Loans v. Aetna Cas. & Sur., 817 
P.2d 341, 347 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). A contract provision provides an exclusive remedy only 
if the parties intended the provision to so provide. Bethers v. Wood, 10 Utah 2d 313, 352 P.2d 
774, 775 (1960). 
2. The Loan Accommodation Agreement is clear and unambiguous. 
3. Almon Milner Covey breached the Loan Accommodation Agreement by failing 
to return the Sears Stock timely. 
4. The Loan Accommodation Agreement anticipated only one circumstance in 
which the Sears Stock could be sold, namely, if Covey & Co. executed on the Sears Stock to 
satisfy margin requirements in Almon Milner Covey's personal margin account at Covey & 
Co. 
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5. It was the intent of the parties that the Sears Stock be returned unless an 
execution sale, as described above, occurred. 
6. The option of recording the Warranty Deed was not the sole remedy for a 
failure to return the Sears Stock. 
7. Specific performance is an equitable remedy addressed to the sense of justice 
and good conscience of the Trial Court. Morris v. Sykes, 624 P.2d 681, 684 (Utah 1981) 
"[Accordingly, considerably attitude of discretion is allowed in his [trial court's] determination as to 
whether it shall be granted and what judgment should be entered in respect thereto; and his ruling 
therein should not be upset on appeal unless it clearly appears that he abused his discretion ...."; Ferris 
v. Jennings, 595 P.2d 857, 859 (Utah 1979). Specific performance of a contract requires that 
the obligations of the parties be set forth with sufficient clarity and definiteness so that the 
contract can be performed according to its terms. Eliason v. Watts, 615 P.2d 427, 428 (Utah 
1980). 
8. The Loan Accommodation Agreement is sufficiently clear and definite to be 
specifically enforced. Accordingly, the Court determines in its discretion, and in good 
conscience, that justice requires specific enforcement of that Agreement. 
9. The Court finds in equity and good conscience that specific performance should 
be granted to Noel Milner Covey, and Almon Milner Covey shall purchase and replace the 
Sears Stock and its progeny, as set forth below. 
10. Noel Milner Covey, acting as agent for Almon Milner Covey, shall utilize the 
proceeds in the Dean Witter money market account, which constitute the proceeds of the 
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Walker Lane sale, and purchase within 10 business days after January 17, 2001, as Almon 
Milner Covey's agent and/or in his name, replacement shares of the Sears Stock and its 
progeny, for delivery to herself to restore her, as much as possible, to the same position she 
would have been in if Almon Milner Covey had returned the Sears Stock in a timely manner 
and made her whole; Noel Milner Covey shall cause these purchases first to be of Morgan 
Stanley/Dean Witter and Allstate stock. If there are sufficient proceeds to purchase all 
necessary shares of Morgan Stanley/Dean Witter and Allstate stock, then Noel Milner Covey 
shall next purchase as many replacement shares of Sears Stock as possible. Noel Milner 
Covey shall then inform Almon Milner Covey, through her attorneys, of all remaining shares 
that need to be purchased; Almon Milner Covey shall then repurchase these shares using his 
own funds and shall deliver confirmation of that purchase to Noel Milner Covey within 50 
calendar days of receiving notice from Noel Milner Covey of the shortfall which he needs to 
purchase. The Court retains jurisdiction of this matter to see that its Orders are carried out and 
for any other further relief needed. 
11. As Noel Milner Covey's stockbroker, Almon Milner Covey, individually, owed 
fiduciary duties to his customer, Noel Milner Covey. Davis v. Merrill Lynch Pearce Finner & 
Smith, 906 F.2d 1206, 1214-15 (8th Cir. 1990); Jaksich v. Thomson McKinnon Securities, Inc., 
582 F. Supp. 485, 502 (S.D.N.Y. 1984). 
12. Almon Milner Covey's fiduciary duties were owed by him, personally and 
individually, to his customer, Noel Milner Covey. 
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13. Noel Milner Covey proved by a preponderance of the evidence that Almon 
Milner Covey violated his fiduciary duties to her and that she was damaged by this breach of 
fiduciary duties. 
14. Almon Milner Covey is personally and individually liable to Noel Milner Covey 
for the monies borrowed by him from her pursuant to the terms of the Promissory Notes and 
pursuant to individual lendings by Noel Milner Covey, as more ftilly set forth in the Judgment 
herein and in the Findings of Fact. 
15. Noel Milner Covey did not elect any remedy other than to seek return of the 
Sears Stock and its progeny. See Royal Resources, Inc. v. Gibraltar Financial Corp., 603 P.2d 
793, 795-97 (Utah 1979)(election of remedies "is a technical rule of procedure and its purpose 
is not to prevent recourse to any remedy, but to prevent double redress for a single wrong. 
Said doctrine presupposes a choice between inconsistent remedies, a knowledgeable selection 
of one thereof, free of fraud or imposition, and a resort to the chosen remedy evincing a 
purpose to forego all others."). 
16. For an accord and satisfaction to occur, there must be: (1) an unliquidated claim 
or a bona fide dispute over the amount due; (2) a payment offered as a full settlement of the 
entire dispute; and (3) an acceptance of the payment as full settlement of the dispute. Promax 
Dev. Corp. v. Raile, 998 P.2d 254, 259 (Utah 2000). General principles of contract law 
govern the existence and interpretation of any accord and satisfaction. State Landscape & 
Snow Removal Specialists, Inc. v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel Co., 844 P.2d 322, 326 (Utah 
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1992). Therefore, a valid accord and satisfaction requires the same "meeting of the minds" as 
any contract. Hintze v. Saeich, 437 P.2d 202, 207 (Utah 1968). 
17. No common agreement, or "accord", or any meeting of the minds was reached 
between the parties regarding the use or receipt of the Walker Lane Sales' net proceeds, the 
return and repurchase of the Sears Stock, the amount of dividends owed, or the amounts owed 
to Noel Milner Covey by Almon Milner Covey on his other obligations. Almon Milner Covey 
failed to carry his burden of proof that an accord and satisfaction occurred. 
18. The doctrine of mitigation of damages generally operates to prevent one against 
whom a wrong has been committed from recovering any item of damage arising from the 
wrongful conduct which could have been avoided or minimized by reasonable means. Angelos 
v. First Interstate Bank of Utah, 671 P.2d 772, 773 (Utah 1983). Almon Milner Covey bore 
the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that Noel Milner Covey failed to 
mitigate damages. John CallEng'g., Inc. v. Manti City Corp., 795 P.2d 678, 680 (UtahCt. 
App. 1990). See also Hector, Inc. v. United Savings Loan Ass'n, 741 P.2d 542, 546 (Utah 
1987) ("avoidable consequences does not include yielding to a wrongful demand by the 
wrongdoer to save the wrongdoer from the legal consequences of his own error"). To mitigate 
damages, a damage party need not embark upon a course of action which would cause further 
detriment. Gierke v. Walker, 927 P.2d 524, 527 (Mont. 1996). Finally, "[w]here the party 
having the primary duty for performance has the same opportunity to perform and the same 
knowledge of the consequences of non-performance as the party to whom the duty is owed, he 
cannot complain about the failure of the latter to perform his duty for him." Anesthesiologists 
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Assoc, v. St. Benedicts Hospital, 852 P.2d 1030, 1040 (Utah App. 1997)(plaintiff not required 
to undertake financially risky efforts to mitigate) Alexander v. Brown, 646 P.2d 692, 695 
(Utah 1982)(defendant, who chose not to perform its obligation when costs were lower, could 
not complain about the increased costs of performance). 
19. Almon Milner Covey did not carry his burden of proof that Noel Milner Covey 
failed to take reasonable steps to mitigate her damages. Almon Milner Covey needed to prove 
by a preponderance of the evidence that Noel Milner Covey failed to take reasonable steps to 
mitigate her damages. There has been no failure by Noel Milner Covey to mitigate damages. 
20. Noel Milner Covey did not waive her right to specific performance or any other 
remedy. "To constitute waiver, one's actions or conduct must be distinctly made, must evince 
in some unequivocal manner, an intent to waive, and must be inconsistent with any other 
intent." Angelos v. First Interstate Bank of Utah, 671 P.2d 772, 776-77 (Utah 1983)(rirmg 
Hunter v. Hunter, 669 P.2d 430, 432 (Utah 1983)). 
21. Almon Milner Covey needed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that 
Noel Milner Covey waived her right to specific performance or any other remedy. Almon 
Milner Covey failed to carry his burden of proof that Noel Milner Covey waived her right to 
specific performance or any other remedy. 
22. Under the doctrine of laches, Almon Milner Covey needed to establish that Noel 
Milner Covey unreasonably delayed in bringing this action, and the he was prejudiced by that 
delay and all other elements associated with the affirmative defense of laches. Nilson-Newey & 
Co. v. Utah Resources Ml, 905 P.2d 312, 314 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). 
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23. Almon Milner Covey bore the burden of proving by a preponderance of the 
evidence that Noel Milner Covey's claims for specific performance were barred by the 
doctrine of laches. 
24. Almon Milner Covey failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that 
there was any unreasonable delay in the bringing of this action or that he was prejudiced by 
any delay. 
25. Almon Milner Covey bore the burden of proving by a preponderance of the 
evidence his estoppel defense. See Corporation Nine v. Taylor, 30 Utah 2d 47, 513 P.2d 417, 
420 (1973) ("[T]he burden of proof and of persuasion as to the issue of estoppel is upon him 
who asserts i t . . . ."). See also Xanthas v. Board of Adjustments of Salt Lake City, 685 P. 2d 
1032, 1038 (Utah 1984)("estoppel may not be used as a defense by a person who has acted in 
bad faith, fraudulently or with knowledge"). 
26. Almon Milner Covey failed to meet his burden of proof that Noel Milner Covey 
was estopped from seeking specific performance of the Loan Accommodation Agreement or 
from seeking relief on any other claim. Noel Milner Covey is not estopped from seeking 
specific performance of the Loan Accommodation Agreement or from seeking relief on any 
other claim. See S&G, Inc. v. Intermountain Power Agency, 913 P.2d 735, 741-42 (Utah 
1996). 
27. When a party to a valid contract commits an uncured material failure in its 
performance of the contract, a failure of consideration occurs and the other party is relieved 
from its duty to continue under the contract. Aquagen Intern., Inc. v. Calrae Trust, 972 P.2d 
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411, 414 (Utah 1998). When a failure of consideration occurs, the contracts ceased to exist. 
Id. 
28. Almon Milner Covey needed to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence 
that there had been a failure or lack of consideration. Almon Milner Covey failed to carry his 
burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence that any failure of consideration occurred. 
29. A party seeking equitable remedies from the court must come into court with 
clean hands. Coleville City v. Lundgren, 930 P.2d 1206, 1210 (Utah Ct. App. 1997)(party 
who repeatedly violated the terms of stipulation and was in contempt of court had unclean 
hands). 
30. Almon Milner Covey raised the affirmative defense that Noel Milner Covey 
could not obtain equitable relief because she had "unclean hands". 
31. The Court finds no evidence to support any claim of unclean hands and 
concludes that Almon Milner Covey failed to carry his burden of proof on the affirmative 
defense of unclean hands. Noel Milner Covey's claims for specific performance and other 
remedies are not barred by the doctrine of unclean hands. 
32. Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 19 deals with the issue of indispensable parties. 
Under Rule 19, the trial court must first determine whether an absent party is necessary. 
Warner-Jacobsen v. Bednarik, 946 P.2d 744, 746-47 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). A necessary party 
is one whose presence is required for a full and fair determination of that party's rights as well 
as the rights of other parties to the action. Cowen & Co, v. Atlas Stock Transfer Co,, 695 P.2d 
109, 114 (Utah 1984). Rule 19 requires joinder of these parties to guard against the entry of a 
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judgment that might prejudice their rights in their absence. Id, Only if the party is necessary, 
;in<l only ill tin mil liiul'. (iiiiKki uiili.'iiMhli must lln1 nun! Jtkliess n id ispensability under 
Rule \{K Werner-Jacobsen, 946 P.2d at '747 
'i 'i C :» \ e> & Co is not an Indispensable party to N* d Miiiicr (.'•*> vey's claims 
against Almon Milner Covey for breach of fiduciary duty. 
cause Noel Milner Covey has prevailed, she is therefore entitled to attorneys' 
fees and costs under the Loan Accommodation Agreement and Promissory '••-•• • it 
of which will be established by further motion as directed by the Court at the end of m;ii 
Wlinviniv iliL" i "4>111( I'iiuh ill ill ilk1 PLiniiill IN*M I IMIIIHT I n \c \ , lias pnruiilcd 
in this matter and that judgment should be entered in favor of the Plaintiff, Noel Milner 
<V\ry 
U» If any Conclusion of Law is found to be a Findings of Fact, it is incorporated 
herein by reference in the Findings of Fact. If any Finding of Fact is found to be a Conclusion 
of Law, it is incorporated herein by reference * 
Dena C. Sarandos, Esq. 
Attorneys for Almon Milner Covey 
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Larry R. Keller, Esq. 
Cohne, Rappaport & Segal 
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P.O. Box 11008 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0008 
j/lTU i/Vtc^/e^ J 
ADDENDUM 3 
I ; DEPOSITION I 
I i EXHIBIT I 
I t ZX.fMMr, I 
LOAN ACCOMMODATION AGREEMENT 
This Loan Accommodation Agreement (the "Agreement'*) is entered into this 19th day of 
September, 1991, by and between Noel Milner Covey ("Lender") and Almon Miiner Covey ("Borrower"),, 
upon the following premises: 
A. Borrower desires to use certain Securities owned by Lender and • specified on 
Exhibit "A", attached hereto and incorporated herein by reference (the "Securities"), as collateral 
on a margin account which Borrower has with a .securities brokerage firm; 
B. Lender is willing, as an accommodation to Borrower; to loan the Securities listed 
on Exhibit "A" to Borrower, so that Borrower may pledge the Securities as collateral on such 
margin account, provided that such Securities are returned to Lender timely; that Borrower provide 
consideration for such accommodation in the form hereinafter described; and that appropriate 
remedies are available to Lender in the event that Borrower does not return the Securities timely; 
and 
C. Borrower has previously borrowed from Lender the sum, of $50,000 pursuant to 
the terms of a promissory note, attached hereto as Exhibit "B" and incorporated herein by 
reference, which Lender is requiring Borrower to repay in connection with the transaction referred 
to above, on the terms hereinafter set forth. 
Agi een lent 
NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing recitals and the terms and conditions 
'after set forth, the parties hereto agree as follows; 
1. I^an of Securities. Concurrently with the execution of this Agreement:,, Lender is 
delivering to Borrower the stock certificate representing the Securities listed on Exhibit "A", together with 
a duly executed stock powers) covering such certificate. Lender .hereby agrees to loan to Borrower the 
Securities for the term set forth herein in order that Borrower may pledge such Securities as collateral on 
his margin account. Lender authorizes Borrower to deliver these Securities to the brokerage firm as 
collateral on such margin account, provided that Borrower enters into an appropriate pledge agreement 
with the brokerage firm under the terms of which ownership of the Securities shall not be transferred 
unless and until the brokerage firm executes on the collateral to cover the required margin in accordance 
with the terms of the pledge agreement and the requirements under Borrower's margin account. In such 
event, Lender shall have all of the remedies set forth in this Agreement. 
2. Consideration for l^iian of Securities. In consideration of Lender's providing the 
Securities set forth in paragraph 1 above, Borrower agrees that he shall bear sole responsibility for all 
necessary repairs to a, 1981 Jeep, Model CJ-5, 85J, Serial No. 1 JCBM85E3BT020450, owned by 
Borrower, which repairs are or may be necessary as a result of Lender borrowing the Jeep from Borrower. 
Lender agrees that Borrower shall have no responsibility whatsoever for any damage or repairs to the Jeep, 
arising from the use of said Jeep prior to the date of this Agreement 
3. ' Previous T^an Transaction. Borrower has previously borrowed the sum of $50,000 from 
Lender pursuant to Exhibit "B" attached hereto, of which 536,000 remains owing to Lender (the ''Note 
Obligation"). Said Note Obligation is past due,,,, Borrower agrees to repay the Note Obligation, together 
with interest at 12.5%, on or before thirty days from the date of this Agreement. Borrower further agrees 
that'all of the remaining terms of such Note Obligation shall remain in full force and effect, including, 
but not limited to, the obligation of Borrower to deliver title to a 1988 black Ferrari, license number AC, 
owned by Borrower, duly endorsed; to be held as collateral until the Note Obligation is repaid in full. 
Such collateral shall be in addition to, and not exclusive of, the real property described in paragraph 5 
below. 
4. Term of T^an. Borrower agrees to return all of the Securities loaned to Borrower within 
thirty days of the date of this Agreement. In the event Borrower does not return the Securities, and pay 
to Lender the entire Note Obligation, with accrued interest, within such thirty day period, Borrower shall 
be required to pay to Lender the sum of S 1,000 per day, for each day after such thirty day period until 
the Securities are returned to Lender, and the Note Obligation, with accrued interest, is paid in full 
5. Warranty Deed to Property. Simultaneously with the execution of this Agreement, 
Borrower is delivering to Lender a Warranty Deed and Notice of Interest in Real Property, attached hereto 
as Exhibits "C" and "D", respectively, and incorporated herein by reference, duly executed by Borrower 
in favor of Lender. Such documents relate to certain real property in Holiday, Utah (the "real property"), 
owned by Borrower. Borrower represents and warrants that he holds good and marketable title to such 
real property, free of any liens or encumbrances except those liens and encumbrances set forth on the 
preliminary title report attached hereto as Exhibit "E\ and incorporated herein by reference. Borrower 
agrees that following the execution of this Agreement, Lender is authorized to record the Notice of Interest 
with the Salt Lake County Recorder's office, in order to provide notice of Borrower's interest in the real 
property pending the return of the Securities and the payment of the Note Obligation. In the event 
Borrower fails to return the Securities and pay the Loan Obligation, with accrued interest, and all 
delinquent fees described in paragraph 4 above, within sixty (60) days of this Agreement, Borrower shall 
be entitled to take title to the real property in lieu thereof and record the Warranty Deed attached hereto 
as Exhibit "C". 
6. Miscellaneous. 
(a) Borrower agrees to pay all costs and expenses incurred in connection with this 
Agreement, including legal fees, the cost of a preliminary title report relating to the real property, 
and other costs. 
(fa) During the twelve month period following the date of this Agreement, Borrower 
agrees to timely notify Lender of any material, changes in the market price of the securities of 
Pinnacle Corporation. 
(c) No failure or delay on the part of Lender in exercising any right, power, or 
remedy under this Agreement or any exhibits or other documents executed and delivered in 
connection herewith shall operate as a waiver thereof; or shall any single or partial exercise of any 
such right, power, or remedy preclude any other or further exercise thereof or the exercise of any 
other right, power, or remedy under this Agreement, the exhibits hereto, or any other document 
executed and delivered in connection herewith. The remedies provided in such documents are 
cumulative and not exclusive of any remedies provided by law. 
(d) This Agreement, including the exhibits hereto, may be executed in an) number 
of counterparts, each of which when 5W executed and delivered shall be deemed to be an original 
and all of which taken together shall be but a single instrument. 
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(e) This Agreement including the exhibits hereto, shall be binding upon arid inure to 
the benefit of Lender and Borrower and their respective successors and assigns, except that 
Borrower shall not have the right to assign his rights hereunder or thereunder or any interest 
therein without the prior written consent of Lender. 
(f) In the event any party institutes any action or suit to enforce this Agreement or 
to secure relief from any default hereunder or breach hereof, the breaching party or parties shall 
reimburse the non-breaching party or parties for all costs, including reasonable attorney's fees, 
incurred in connection therewith and in enforcing or collecting any judgement rendered therein. 
(g) This Agreement shall be governed by and construed in accordance with the laws 
of the state of Utah. 
~ (h) Any provision of this Agreement which is prohibited or unenforceable shall be 
ineffective to the extent of such prohibition or enforceability without invalidating the remaining 
provisions thereof. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have executed this Agreement as of the date first-above 
w ritten 
Almon Milner Covey / 
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SECURITIES LOANED BY LENDER: 
7,219 Shares of Sears, Roebucl I & 
Certificate No. MG558550 
EXHIBIT "A" 
accommodation Agreement 
Co., registered in the name of Noel Miner Covey -
AAAAO n 
EXHIBIT MB" 
PROMISSORY NOTE 
50 , 000 .00 MAY J 4 . 
D«.: > f. ? 
i 19 I 
FOR VALUE RECEIVED, the undersianeti Almon Milner Covey 
. aromise(s) to pay NOEL MILNER COVEY 
FIFTY THOUSAND' dollars CSSCQOO). toaether with interest 
f.-^ m date at the rate of 12 L/2 nercent (1?. I/2S) oer annum 
Oi, Mne unnaid balance, cayabla as follows, viz: Due May 31st. 
199.1. On demand in lawful money of the United States of America, 
nocietiob I ? and oevable at the office 
BANK, without defalcation or discount, 
orovid-d for shall be a DO lied first 
balance to reduction of principal. Any installments of principal 
or.ci interest not oaid when due shall, at the option of the leaal 
holder' hereof, bear interest thereafter at the rate of _ 18 
percent ( 18 Z ) oer an n i i m u nti1 paid. 
of ZION3 FIRST NATIONAL 
All payments hereinafter 
on accrued interest and 
note is collateralized by Almon Milner Covey's black 
Ferrari, Utah license number _/± CL-.„.> of which 
Noel Milner Covey's oossession at 
National Bank safety deposit box. 
This 
1333 t 
t L•: 1 e is ou t in 
the siqned 
Zion s F.i rst 
In case of default in the payment: of any installment of 
crincioal or interest as herein stipulated, then it shall be 
optional with leaal holder of this note to declare the entire 
orincioai sum hereof due and payable: and procaedinas may at once 
be instituted for the recovery of the same by law,, with accrued 
interest and costs, including attorney's fees. 
T1: i e fi) akers and endorsers seve i ally waive prese n t m e n t , 
orotest and demand: and waive notice of protest, demand and of 
dishonoi and non-payment of this note, and expressly aqrree that 
this note, or any payment thereunder, may be extended from time 
to time without in any way effecting the liability of the makers 
arid endorsers thereof. 
x 
Almon Milne;: Covey/ 
tjr/-
Paid i n F u l l 
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Almon Milner Covey 
of
 Salt Lake City 
Space Above for Recorder 's Use 
UarranlQ leeii 
.Countyof
 S a l t L a k e 
hereby CONVEY and WARM f IT i N o e l M i l n e r C o v e y 
grantor, 
State of Utah, 
o f i ,11111 it v ul 
for the sum of 5 1 0 . 0 0 
The receipt and adaqurt< >r •> i' w h i 
the following described tract of land in 
grantee, 
State of Utah, 
DOLLARS, 
i ! i e r e b y « . i c k n o w l e d g e d . 
County, State of Utaht to-wit: 
See Exhibit "A*1 attached hereto and by this reference u\r\r\*> n 
part hereof. 
Such property is conveyed subject to a Deed of Trust between 
Almon Milner Covey, trustor, Associated Title Co., trustee, and 
First Interstate Bank of Utah and Nancy Jane Wallace, co-trustees 
of the John M. Wallace, Jr. Marital Trust, as Beneficiaries, dated 
December 7, 1989, which Deed of Trust secures an obligation in the 
amount of $240,000 made by Trustor, 
WITNESS the hand ul «.ui id gi ij] u 11 lis 
Signed in the presence of 
day of 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF ( 
On the 1c { t \ day of September 
ss 
A l m o n M i l n e r C o v e y 
who duly acknowledged to me that he executed the same. 
i J i , personally appeared before me 
, the signer of the above instrument, 
MvConr 
NOTARY PUBUC 
MM*2tt» 
MEMLLT. HUMAN 
1«2Wa*1«0NertiM 
\\6AWCK ix-
Notary Public 
RjoxjiffifTU a t " 
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LEGAL DESCRIPTION 
The land referred to in the Warranty Deed of even date herewith is situated in Sail 1. u.k:, -in,.] ,:> 
described as follows: 
PARCEL 2: 
BEGINNING AT A POINT SOUTH 89 DEGREES 39 MINUTES 23 SECONDS WEST 1225.72 
FEET AND NORTH 164.19 FEET FROM THE EAST QUARTER CORNER OF SECTION 15, 
TOWNSHIP 2 SOUTH, RANGE 1 EAST, SALT LAKE BASE AND MERIDIAN, AND 
RUNNING THENCE NORTH 219.81 FEET; THENCE EAST 248.32 FEET; THENCE SOUTH 
0 DEGREES 10 MINUTES EAST 219.81 FEET; THENCE WEST 248.96 FEET TO THE 
POINT OF BEGINNING. 
PARCEL 2, AS DESCRIBED ABOVfc. IS rOGETIfl-H '. 
WAY: 
BEGINNING AT A POINT SOUTH 89 DEGREES 39 MINUTES 23 SECONDS WEST 977.93 
FEET AND NORTH 568.73 FEET FROM THE EAST QUARTER CORNER OF SECTION 15, 
TOWNSHIP 2 SOUTH, RANGE 1 EAST, SALT LAKE BASE AND MERIDIAN, AND 
RUNNING THENCE SOUTH 0 DEGREES 10 MINUTES EAST 406.02 FEET; THENCE 
WEST 198.96 FEET; THENCE SOUTH 10.0 FEET; THENCE WEST 60.0 FEET; THENCE 
NORTH 45.0 FEET; THENCE EAST 60.0 FEET; THENCE SOUTH 10.0 FEET; THENCE 
EAST 163.23 FEET; THENCE NORTH 45 DEGREES EAST 15.0 FEET; THENCE NORTH 
0 DEGREES 10 MINUTES WEST 335.41 FEET; THENCE WEST 10.0 FEET; THENCE 
NORTH 0 DEGREES 10 MINUTES WEST 35.0 FEET; THENCE EAST 35.0 FEET TO THE 
POINT OF BEGINNING. 
ALSO PARCEL 2, AS DESCRIBED ABOVE IS TOGETHER WITH A 20 FOOT WIDE 
RIGHT OF WAY, BEING 10 FOOT ON EACH SIDE OF THE FOLLOWING DESCRIBED 
CENTERLINE: 
BEGINNING AT A POINT SOUTH 89 DEGREES 39 MINUTES 23 SECONDS WEST 606 .28 
FEET AND NORTH 0 DEGREES 10 MINUTES WEST 1253.01 FEET AND NORTH 80 
DEGREES 15 MINUTES WEST 280.98 FEET; THENCE SOUTH 0 DEGREES 10 MINUTES 
EAST 10 FEET FROM THE EAST QUARTER CORNER OF SECTION 15, TOWNSHIP 2 
SOUTH, RANGE 1 EAST, SALT LAKE BASE AND MERIDIAN; AND RUNNING THENCE 
WEST 10 FEET; THENCE NORTH 830 FEET TO EXISTING GRAVEL ROAD AND 
CONTINUING ALONG SAID ROAD; THENCE NORTH 16 DEGREES WEST 80 FEET; 
THENCE NORTH 43 DEGREES WEST 40 FEET; THENCE WEST 360 FEET, TO AND 
ADJOINING WALKER LANE. 
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ALSO PARCEL 2, AS DESCRIBED ABOVE IS TOGETHER WITH A 20 FOOT WIDE 
RIGHT OF WAY, BEING 10 FEET ON EACH SIDE OF THE FOLLOWING DESCRIBED 
CENTERLINE: 
BEGINNING AT A POINT WHICH IS SOUTH 89 DEGREES 39 MINUTES 23 SECONDS 
WEST 606.28 FEET, AND NORTH 0 DEGREES 10 MINUTES WEST 1253.01 FEET, AND 
NORTH 80 DEGREES. 15 MINUTES WEST 280.98 FEET, AND SOUTH 0 DEGREES 15 
MINUTES EAST 10 FEET FROM THE EAST QUARTER CORNER OF SECTION 15, 
TOWNSHIP 2 SOUTH, RANGE 1 EAST, SALT LAKE BASE AND MERIDIAN; AND 
RUNNING THENCE SOUTH 83 DEGREES EAST 195.0 FEET; THENCE SOUTH 45 
DEGREES EAST 90 FEET; THENCE SOUTH 7 DEGREES WEST 230 FEET; THENCE 
SOUTH 7 DEGREES EAST 360 FEET; THENCE SOUTH 45 DEGREES WEST 90 FEET; 
THENCE WEST 305 FEET TO THE WEST LINE OF WALLACE WOOD, A NON-REGULAR 
SUBDIVISION. 
PARCEL 3: 
BEGINNING AT A POINT SOUTH 89 DEGREES 39 MINUTES 23 SECONDS WEST 977.39 
FEET AND NORTH 382.52 FEET FROM THE EAST QUARTER CORNER OF SECTION 15, 
TOWNSHIP 2 SOUTH, RANGE 1 EAST, SALT LAKE BASE AND MERIDIAN, AND 
RUNNING THENCE WEST 446.49 FEET, MORE OR LESS, TO THE WEST LINE OF THE 
PROPERTY DESCRIBED IN THAT CERTAIN CORRECTIVE SPECIAL WARRANTY DEED, 
RECORDED JULY 29, 1988, AS ENTRY NO. 4817887, IN BOOK 6155, AT PAGE 1790, 
SALT LAKE COUNTY RECORDER'S OFFICE; THENCE NORTH ALONG SAID WEST 
LINE, 376.74 FEET; THENCE EAST 445.4 FEET, MORE OR LESS, THENCE SOUTH 0 
DEGREES 10 MINUTES EAST 376.75 FEET, TO THE POINT OF BEGINNING. 
PARCEL 3 AS DESCRIBED ABOVE IS SUBJECT TO AND TOGETHER WITH A 20 FOOT 
WIDE RIGHT OF WAY, BEING 10 FOOT ON EACH SIDE OF THE FOLLOWING 
DESCRIBED CENTERLINE: 
BEGINNING AT A POINT SOUTH 89 DEGREES 39 MINUTES 23 SECONDS WEST 606.28 
FEET AND NORTH 0 DEGREES 10 MINUTES WEST 1253.01 FEET AND NORTH 80 
DEGREES 15 MINUTES WEST 280.98 FEET; THENCE SOUTH 0 DEGREES 10 MINUTES 
EAST 10 FEET FROM THE EAST QUARTER CORNER OF SECTION 15, TOWNSHIP 2 
SOUTH, RANGE 1 EAST, SALT LAKE BASE AND MERIDIAN, AND RUNNING THENCE 
WEST 10 FEET; THENCE NORTH 830 FEET TO EXISTING GRAVEL ROAD AND 
CONTINUING ALONG SAID ROAD; THENCE NORTH 16 DEGREES WEST 80 FEET; 
THENCE NORTH 43 DEGREES WEST 40 FEET; THENCE WEST 360 FEET TO ADJOINING 
WALKER LANE. 
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ALSO PARCEL 3, AS DESCRIBED ABOVE IS TOGETHER WITH A 20 FOOT WIDE 
RIGHT OF WAY, BEING 10 FEET ON EACH SIDE OF THE FOLLOWING DESCRIBED 
CENTERLINE: 
BEGINNING AT A POINT WHICH IS SOUTH 89 DEGREES 39 MINUTES 23 SECONDS 
WEST 606.28 FEET, AND NORTH 0 DEGREES 10 MINUTES WEST 1253.01 FEET AND 
NORTH 80 DEGREES'15 MINUTES WEST 280.98 FEET, AND SOUTH 0 DEGREES 15 
MINUTES EAST 10 FEET FROM THE EAST QUARTER CORNER OF SECTION 15, 
TOWNSHIP 2 SOUTH, RANGE 1 EAST, SALT LAKE BASE AND MERIDIAN, AND 
RUNNING THENCE SOUTH 83 DEGREES EAST 195.0 FEET; THENCE SOUTH 45 
DEGREES EAST 90 FEET; THENCE SOUTH 7 DEGREES WEST 230 FEET; THENCE 
SOUTH 7 DEGREES EAST 360 FEET; THENCE SOUTH 45 DEGREES WEST 90 FEET; 
THENCE WEST 305 FEET TO THE WEST LINE OF WALLACE WOOD, A NON-REGULAR 
SUBDIVISION, ACCORDING TO THE OFFICIAL PLAT THEREOF ON FILE AND OF 
RECORD IN THE SALT LAKE COUNTY RECORDER'S OFFICE. 
ALSO PARCEL 3, AS DESCRIBED ABOVE IS TOGETHER WITH A 20 FOOT WIDE 
RIGHT OF WAY, BEING 10 FEET ON EITHER SIDE OF THE FOLLOWING DESCRIBED 
CENTERLINE: 
BEGINNING AT A POINT ON THE SOUTH LINE OF WALKER'S LANE, SAID POINT 
BEING SOUTH 412.00 FEET AND EAST 1233.00 FEET FROM THE NORTH QUARTER 
CORNER OF SECTION 15, TOWNSHIP 2 SOUTH, RANGE 1 EAST, SALT LAKE BASE 
AND MERIDIAN, AND RUNNING THENCE SOUTH 0 DEGREES 15 MINUTES 30 
SECONDS EAST 122.0 FEET; THENCE SOUTH 15 DEGREES 42 MINUTES 30 SECONDS 
WEST 47.30 FEET; THENCE SOUTH 8 DEGREES 09 MINUTES EAST 93.00 FEET; 
THENCE SOUTH 7 DEGREES 55 MINUTES WEST 58.00 FEET; THENCE SOUTH 14 
DEGREES 17 MINUTES EAST 46.00 FEET; THENCE SOUTH 1 DEGREE 39 MINUTES 30 
SECONDS WEST 94.00 FEET; THENCE SOUTH 0 DEGREES 07 MINUTES EAST 116.00 
FEET; THENCE SOUTH 1 DEGREE 22 MINUTES EAST 107.00 FEET; THENCE SOUTH 2 
DEGREES 27 MINUTES 30 SECONDS WEST 130.00 FEET; THENCE SOUTH 3 DEGREES 
22 MINUTES EAST 105.00 FEET; THENCE SOUTH 5 DEGREES 16 MINUTES 30 
SECONDS WEST 53.00 FEET; THENCE SOUTH 0 DEGREES 03 MINUTES 30 SECONDS 
EAST 105.00 FEET; THENCE SOUTH 0 DEGREES 56 MINUTES 30 SECONDS WEST 
100.00 FEET; THENCE SOUTH 2 DEGREES 06 MINUTES 30 SECONDS WEST 135.0 FEET; 
THENCE SOUTH 2 DEGREES 13 MINUTES 20 SECONDS EAST 56 FEET; THENCE 
SOUTH 39 DEGREES 46 MINUTES 30 SECONDS WEST 72.75 FEET TO AN EXISTING 
ROAD; 
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ALSO PARCEL 3, AS DESCRIBED ABOVE IS SUBJECT TO AND TOGETHER WITH A 
RIGHT OF WAY ACROSS THE FOLLOWING: 
BEGINNING AT A POINT WHICH IS 2320.55 FEET SOUTH 0 DEGREES 02 MINUTES 00 
SECONDS WEST AND 1224.26 FEET SOUTH 89 DEGREES 47 MINUTES 00 SECONDS 
EAST FROM THE NORTHWEST CORNER OF THE NORTHEAST QUARTER OF SECTION 
15, TOWNSHIP 2 SOUTH, RANGE 1 EAST, OF THE SALT LAKE BASE AND MERIDIAN, 
AND RUNNING THENCE NORTH 1 DEGREE 07 MINUTES 00 SECONDS EAST 331.154 
FEET; THENCE NORTH 14 DEGREES 31 MINUTES 00 SECONDS WEST 159.7 FEET; 
THENCE NORTH 0 DEGREES 13 MINUTES 00 SECONDS EAST 20 FEET, MORE OR 
LESS; THENCE SOUTH 89 DEGREES 47 MINUTES 00 SECONDS EAST 50.6 FEET, MORE 
OR LESS, TO THE WEST LINE OF THE GLENN WALKER WALLACE PROPERTY; 
THENCE SOUTH 0 DEGREES 13 MINUTES 00 SECONDS WEST 505.95 FEET; THENCE 
NORTH 89 DEGREES 47 MINUTES 00 SECONDS WEST 19.5 FEET TO THE POINT OF 
BEGINNING. 
PARCELS 2 AND 3, AS DESCRIBED ABOVE AND TOGETHER REFERRED TO HERE AS 
"THE PROPERTY", IS SUBJECT TO CERTAIN USES AND EASEMENTS APPURTENANT 
TO A PARCEL OF LAND LYING NORTH OF "THE PROPERTY" AS FOLLOWS: 
(1) AN EASEMENT OVER "THE PROPERTY" WITH THE RIGHT OF INGRESS AND 
EGRESS FOR THE PURPOSES OF OPERATION, MAINTENANCE, REPAIR AND 
REPLACEMENT OF AN UNDIVIDED ONE-HALF INTEREST IN AND TO A CERTAIN 
WATER WELL LOCATED AT A POINT NORTH 316.5 FEET AND WEST 1,142.4 FEET 
FROM THE EAST QUARTER CORNER OF SAID SECTION 15; 
(2) AN EASEMENT OVER THE PROPERTY" WITH THE RIGHT OF INGRESS AND 
EGRESS FOR THE PURPOSE OF OPERATION, MAINTENANCE, REPAIR AND 
REPLACEMENT OF A WATER PIPELINE AND ITS APPURTENANCES RUNNING 
NORTHERLY FROM SAID WELL TO "THE PROPERTY" LINE; 
(3) EASEMENTS OVER THE PROPERTY" WITH THE RIGHT OF INGRESS AND 
EGRESS FOR THE PURPOSE OF OPERATION, MAINTENANCE AND REPAIR OF THE 
DITCHES OF THE GREEN DITCH WATER COMPANY AND THE WALKER DITCH 
WATER COMPANY. SUCH EASEMENTS RUN WITH AND BENEFIT THE FOLLOWING 
PARCEL OF LAND TO THE NORTH OF "THE PROPERTY", AND CONSTITUTE 
CONTINUING EASEMENTS OVER "THE PROPERTY": 
BEGINNING AT A POINT LOCATED 976.28 FEET SOUTH 89 DEGREES 39 MINUTES 23 
SECONDS WEST AND 759.25 FEET NORTH 0 DEGREES 10 MINUTES WEST FROM THE 
EAST QUARTER CORNER OF SECTION 15, TOWNSHIP 2 SOUTH, RANGE 1 EAST, SALT 
LAKE BASE AND MERIDIAN, AND RUNNING THENCE NORTH 0 DEGREES 10 
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MINUTES WEST 15.75 FEET, THENCE NORTH 61 DEGREES 29 MINUTES 14 SECONDS 
EAST 105.91 FEET, THENCE NORTH 0 DEGREES 10 MINUTES WEST 485.65 FEET, 
THENCE SOUTH 80 DEGREES 15 MINUTES EAST 4.88 FEET; THENCE NORTH 202.45 
FEET, THENCE WEST 531.70 FEET, THENCE SOUTH 753.58 FEET, THENCE EAST 435.28 
FEET TO THE POINT OF BEGINNING. 
DATED this £^day of September, 1991. 
Grantor 
Almon M. Covey 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
) ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
On this 1 ^ "day of September, 1991, before me personally appeared Almon M. Covey 
to me known to be the person indicated on the foregoing Warranty Deed as the Grantor, and who 
executed the above in my presence and acknowledged that he executed the same as his free aa 
and deed. 
My Commission Expires: 
ik X.UAAIVL'W 
Notary Public 
Residing At: Salt Lake County, Utah 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
F*wy 22.11* 
IBHB1T.MU9UN 
1452 ¥ M 1W * « * " 
L*W,UtahM041 
EXHIBIT *iT 
NOTICE OF INTEREST IN REAL PROPERTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE 
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN: 
Notice is hereby given that Noel Milner Covey has an interest in that certain real property situate 
in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, described as follows: 
See Exhibit "A", attached hereto and incorporated herein by reference. 
Said interest is evidenced by a certain Loan Accommodation Agreement dated September 19, 
1991, by and between Almon Milner Covey, as Borrower, and the undersigned Noel Milner Covej 
Lender. 
Almon Milner Covey 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 19th day of September A. D„ 1991. 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
Mnan22.1t* 
HeSHBLLtHMWMI 
14ttW«ft1«Natif4 
My Commission Expires: 
February 22, 1995 
Notary Public 
Residing in Davis, County, State of Utah 
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The land referred to in the Notice of Interest in Real Property of even date herewith is situated 
in Salt Lake City, and is described as follows: 
PARCEL 2: 
BEGINNING AT A POINT SOUTH 89 DEGREES 39 MINUTES 23 SECONDS WEST 1225.72 
FEET AND NORTH 164.19 FEET FROM THE EAST QUARTER CORNER OF SECTION 15, 
TOWNSHIP 2 SOUTH, RANGE 1 EAST, SALT LAKE BASE AND MERIDIAN, AND 
RUNNING THENCE NORTH 219.81 FEET; THENCE EAST 24832 FEET; THENCE SOUTH 
0 DEGREES 10 MINUTES EAST 219.81 FEET; THENCE WEST 248.96 FEET TO THE 
POINT OF BEGINNING. 
PARCEL 2, AS DESCRIBED ABOVE IS TOGETHER WITH THE FOLLOWING RIGHT OF 
WAY: 
BEGINNING AT A POINT SOUTH 89 DEGREES 39 MINUTES 23 SECONDS WEST 977.93 
FEET AND NORTH 568.73 FEET FROM THE EAST QUARTER CORNER OF SECTION 15, 
TOWNSHIP 2 SOUTH, RANGE 1 EAST, SALT LAKE BASE AND MERIDIAN, AND 
RUNNING THENCE SOUTH 0 DEGREES 10 MINUTES EAST 406.02 FEET; THENCE 
WEST 198.96 FEET; THENCE SOUTH 10.0 FEET; THENCE WEST 60.0 FEET; THENCE 
NORTH 45.0 FEET; THENCE EAST 60.0 FEET; THENCE SOUTH 10.0 FEET; THENCE 
EAST 163.23 FEET; THENCE NORTH 45 DEGREES EAST 15.0 FEET; THENCE NORTH 
0 DEGREES 10 MINUTES WEST 335.41 FEET; THENCE WEST 10.0 FEET; THENCE 
NORTH 0 DEGREES 10 MINUTES WEST 35.0 FEET; THENCE EAST 35.0 FEET TO THE 
POINT OF BEGINNING. 
ALSO PARCEL 2, AS DESCRIBED ABOVE IS TOGETHER WTTH A 20 FOOT WIDE 
RIGHT OF WAY, BEING 10 FOOT ON EACH SIDE OF THE FOLLOWING DESCRIBED 
CENTERUNE: 
BEGINNING AT A POINT SOUTH 89 DEGREES 39 MINUTES 23 SECONDS WEST 606 .28 
FEET AND NORTH 0 DEGREES 10 MINUTES WEST 1253.01 FEET AND NORTH 80 
DEGREES 15 MINUTES WEST 280.98 FEET; THENCE SOUTH 0 DEGREES 10 MINUTES 
EAST 10 FEET FROM THE EAST QUARTER CORNER OF SECTION 15, TOWNSHIP 2 
SOUTH, RANGE 1 EAST, SALT LAKE BASE AND MERIDIAN; AND RUNNING THENCE 
WEST 10 FEET; THENCE NORTH 830 FEET TO EXISTING GRAVEL ROAD AND 
CONTINUING ALONG SAID ROAD; THENCE NORTH 16 DEGREES WEST 80 FEET; 
THENCE NORTH 43 DEGREES WEST 40 FEET; THENCE WEST 360 FEET, TO AND 
ADJOINING WALKER LANE. 
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ALSO PARCEL 2, AS DESCRIBED ABOVE IS TOGETHER WITH A 20 FOOT WIDE 
RIGHT OF WAY, BEING 10 FEET ON EACH SIDE OF THE FOLLOWING DESCRIBED 
CENTERUNE: 
BEGINNING AT A POINT WHICH IS SOUTH 89 DEGREES 39 MINUTES 23 SECONDS 
WEST 60628 FEET, AND NORTH 0 DEGREES 10 MINUTES WEST 1253.01 FEET, AND 
NORTH 80 DEGREES 15 MINUTES WEST 280.98 FEET, AND SOUTH 0 DEGREES 15 
MINUTES EAST 10 FEET FROM THE EAST QUARTER CORNER OF SECTION 15, 
TOWNSHIP 2 SOUTH, RANGE 1 EAST, SALT LAKE BASE AND MERIDIAN; AND 
RUNNING THENCE SOUTH 83 DEGREES EAST 195.0 FEET; THENCE SOUTH 45 
DEGREES EAST 90 FEET; THENCE SOUTH 7 DEGREES WEST 230 FEET; THENCE 
SOUTH 7 DEGREES EAST 360 FEET; THENCE SOUTH 45 DEGREES WEST 90 FEET; 
THENCE WEST 305 FEET TO THE WEST LINE OF WALLACE WOOD, A NON-REGULAR 
SUBDIVISION. 
PARCEL 3: 
BEGINNING AT A POINT SOUTH 89 DEGREES 39 MINUTES 23 SECONDS WEST 97739 
FEET AND NORTH 382.52 FEET FROM THE EAST QUARTER CORNER OF SECTION 15, 
TOWNSHIP 2 SOUTH, RANGE 1 EAST, SALT LAKE BASE AND MERIDIAN, AND 
RUNNING THENCE WEST 446.49 FEET, MORE OR LESS, TO THE WEST LINE OF THE 
PROPERTY DESCRIBED IN THAT CERTAIN CORRECTIVE SPECIAL WARRANTY DEED, 
RECORDED JULY 29, 1988, AS ENTRY NO. 4817887, IN BOOK 6155, AT PAGE 1790, 
SALT LAKE COUNTY RECORDER'S OFFICE; THENCE NORTH ALONG SAID WEST 
LINE, 376.74 FEET; THENCE EAST 445.4 FEET, MORE OR LESS, THENCE SOUTH 0 
DEGREES 10 MINUTES EAST 376.75 FEET, TO THE POINT OF BEGINNING. 
PARCEL 3 AS DESCRIBED ABOVE IS SUBJECT TO AND TOGETHER WITH A 20 FOOT 
WIDE RIGHT OF WAY, BEING 10 FOOT ON EACH SIDE OF THE FOLLOWING 
DESCRIBED CENTERUNE: 
BEGINNING AT A POINT SOUTH 89 DEGREES 39 MINUTES 23 SECONDS WEST 606.28 
FEET AND NORTH 0 DEGREES 10 MINUTES WEST 1253.01 FEET AND NORTH 80 
DEGREES 15 MINUTES WEST 280.98 FEET; THENCE SOUTH 0 DEGREES 10 MINUTES 
EAST 10 FEET FROM THE EAST QUARTER CORNER OF SECTION 15, TOWNSHIP 2 
SOUTH, RANGE 1 EAST, SALT LAKE BASE AND MERIDIAN, AND RUNNING THENCE 
WEST 10 FEET; THENCE NORTH 830 FEET TO EXISTING GRAVEL ROAD AND 
CONTINUING ALONG SAID ROAD; THENCE NORTH 16 DEGREES WEST 80 FEET; 
THENCE NORTH 43 DEGREES WEST 40 FEET; THENCE WEST 360 FEET TO ADJOINING 
WALKER LANE. 
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ALSO PARCEL 3, AS DESCRIBED ABOVE IS TOGETHER WITH A 20 FOOT WIDE 
RIGHT OF WAY, BEING 10 FEET ON EACH SIDE OF THE FOLLOWING DESCRIBED 
CENTERLINE: 
BEGINNING AT A POINT WHICH IS SOUTH 89 DEGREES 39 MINUTES 23 SECONDS 
WEST 606.28 FEET, AND NORTH 0 DEGREES 10 MINUTES WEST 1253.01 FEET AND 
NORTH 80 DEGREES 15 MINUTES WEST 280.98 FEET, AND SOUTH 0 DEGREES 15 
MINUTES EAST 10 FEET FROM THE EAST QUARTER CORNER OF SECTION 15, 
TOWNSHIP 2 SOUTH, RANGE 1 EAST, SALT LAKE BASE AND MERIDIAN, AND 
RUNNING THENCE SOUTH 83 DEGREES EAST 195.0 FEET; THENCE SOUTH 45 
DEGREES EAST 90 FEET; THENCE SOUTH 7 DEGREES WEST 230 FEET; THENCE 
SOUTH 7 DEGREES EAST 360 FEET; THENCE SOUTH 45 DEGREES WEST 90 FEET; 
THENCE WEST 305 FEET TO THE WEST LINE OF WALLACE WOOD, A NON-REGULAR 
SUBDIVISION, ACCORDING TO THE OFFICIAL PLAT THEREOF ON FILE AND OF 
RECORD IN THE SALT LAKE COUNTY RECORDER'S OFFICE. 
ALSO PARCEL 3, AS DESCRIBED ABOVE IS TOGETHER WITH A 20 FOOT WIDE 
RIGHT OF WAY, BEING 10 FEET ON EITHER SIDE OF THE FOLLOWING DESCRIBED 
CENTERUNE: 
BEGINNING AT A POINT ON THE SOUTH LINE OF WALKER'S LANE, SAID POINT 
BEING SOUTH 412.00 FEET AND EAST 1233.00 FEET FROM THE NORTH QUARTER 
CORNER OF SECTION 15, TOWNSHIP 2 SOUTH, RANGE 1 EAST, SALT LAKE BASE 
AND MERIDIAN, AND RUNNING THENCE SOUTH "0 DEGREES 15 MINUTES 30 
SECONDS EAST 122.0 FEET; THENCE SOUTH 15 DEGREES 42 MINUTES 30 SECONDS 
WEST 4730 FEET; THENCE SOUTH 8 DEGREES 09 MINUTES EAST 93.00 FEET; 
THENCE SOUTH 7 DEGREES 55 MINUTES WEST 58.00 FEET; THENCE SOUTH 14 
DEGREES 17 MINUTES EAST 46.00 FEET; THENCE SOUTH 1 DEGREE 39 MINUTES 30 
SECONDS WEST 94.00 FEET; THENCE SOUTH 0 DEGREES 07 MINUTES EAST 116.00 
FEET; THENCE SOUTH 1 DEGREE 22 MINUTES EAST 107.00 FEET; THENCE SOUTH 2 
DEGREES 27 MINUTES 30 SECONDS WEST 130.00 FEET; THENCE SOUTH 3 DEGREES 
22 MINUTES EAST 105.00 FEET; THENCE SOUTH 5 DEGREES 16 MINUTES 30 
SECONDS WEST 53.00 FEET; THENCE SOUTH 0 DEGREES 03 MINUTES 30 SECONDS 
EAST 105.00 FEET; THENCE SOUTH 0 DEGREES 56 MINUTES 30 SECONDS WEST 
100.00 FEET; THENCE SOUTH 2 DEGREES 06 MINUTES 30 SECONDS WEST 135.0 FEET; 
THENCE SOUTH 2 DEGREES 13 MINUTES 20 SECONDS EAST 56 FEET; THENCE 
SOUTH 39 DEGREES 46 MINUTES 30 SECONDS WEST 72.75 FEET TO AN EXISTING 
ROAD; 
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ALSO PARCEL 3, AS DESCRIBED ABOVE IS SUBJECT TO AND TOGETHER WITH A 
RIGHT OF WAY ACROSS THE FOLLOWING: 
BEGINNING AT A POINT WHICH IS 2320.55 FEET SOUTH 0 DEGREES 02 MINUTES 00 
SECONDS WEST AND 1224.26 FEET SOUTH 89 DEGREES 47 MINUTES 00 SECONDS 
EAST FROM THE NORTHWEST CORNER OF THE NORTHEAST QUARTER OF SECTION 
15, TOWNSHIP 2 SOUTH, RANGE 1 EAST, OF THE SALT LAKE BASE AND MERIDIAN, 
AND RUNNING THENCE NORTH 1 DEGREE 07 MINUTES 00 SECONDS EAST 331.154 
FEET; THENCE NORTH 14 DEGREES 31 MINUTES 00 SECONDS WEST 159.7 FEET; 
THENCE NORTH 0 DEGREES 13 MINUTES 00 SECONDS EAST 20 FEET, MORE OR 
LESS; THENCE SOUTH 89 DEGREES 47 MINUTES 00 SECONDS EAST 50.6 FEET, MORE 
OR LESS, TO THE WEST LINE OF THE GLENN WALKER WALLACE PROPERTY; 
THENCE SOUTH 0 DEGREES 13 MINUTES 00 SECONDS WEST 505.95 FEET; THENCE 
NORTH 89 DEGREES 47 MINUTES 00 SECONDS WEST 19.5 FEET TO THE POINT OF 
BEGINNING. 
PARCELS 2 AND 3, AS DESCRIBED ABOVE AND TOGETHER REFERRED TO HERE AS 
THE PROPERTY", IS SUBJECT TO CERTAIN USES AND EASEMENTS APPURTENANT 
TO A PARCEL OF LAND LYING NORTH OF "THE PROPERTY" AS FOLLOWS: 
(1) AN EASEMENT OVER "THE PROPERTY" WITH THE RIGHT OF INGRESS AND 
EGRESS FOR THE PURPOSES OF OPERATION, MAINTENANCE, REPAIR AND 
REPLACEMENT OF AN UNDIVIDED ONE-HALF INTEREST IN AND TO A CERTAIN 
WATER WELL LOCATED AT A POINT NORTH 316.5 FEET AND WEST 1,142.4 FEET 
FROM THE EAST QUARTER CORNER OF SAID SECTION 15; 
(2) AN EASEMENT OVER THE PROPERTY" WITH THE RIGHT OF INGRESS AND 
EGRESS FOR THE PURPOSE OF OPERATION, MAINTENANCE, REPAIR AND 
REPLACEMENT OF A WATER PIPELINE AND ITS APPURTENANCES RUNNING 
NORTHERLY FROM SAID WELL TO "THE PROPERTY" LINE; 
(3) EASEMENTS OVER THE PROPERTY" WITH THE RIGHT OF INGRESS AND 
EGRESS FOR THE PURPOSE OF OPERATION, MAINTENANCE AND REPAIR OF THE 
DITCHES OF THE GREEN DrTCH WATER COMPANY AND THE WALKER DITCH 
WATER COMPANY. SUCH EASEMENTS RUN WITH AND BENEFIT THE FOLLOWING 
PARCEL OF LAND TO THE NORTH OF "THE PROPERTY", AND CONSTTrUTE 
CONTINUING EASEMENTS OVER "THE PROPERTY": 
BEGINNING AT A POINT LOCATED 976.28 FEET SOUTH 89 DEGREES 39 MINUTES 23 
SECONDS WEST AND 759.25 FEET NORTH 0 DEGREES 10 MINUTES WEST FROM THE 
EAST QUARTER CORNER OF SECTION 15, TOWNSHIP 2 SOUTH, RANGE 1 EAST, SALT 
LAKE BASE AND MERIDIAN, AND RUNNING THENCE NORTH 0 DEGREES 10 
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MINUTES WEST 15.75 FEET, THENCE NORTH 61 DEGREES 29 MINUTES 14 SECONDS 
EAST 105.91 FEET, THENCE NORTH 0 DEGREES 10 MINUTES WEST 485.65 FEET, 
THENCE SOUTH 80 DEGREES 15 MINUTES EAST 4.88 FEET; THENCE NORTH 202.45 
FEET, THENCE WEST 531.70 FEET, THENCE SOUTH 753.58 FEET, THENCE EAST 435.28 
FEET TO THE POINT OF BEGINNING. 
DATED this fL^day of September, 1991. 
Grantor 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
) ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
On this ^ day of September, 1991, before me personally appeared Almon M. Covey 
to me known to be the person indicated on the foregoing Warranty Deed as the Grantor, and who 
executed the above in my presence and acknowledged that he executed the same as his free act 
and deed. 
My Commission Expires: 
•-2/^ m 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
Fabnary 22.190S 
HESHaLT.HJUJ9UM 
14S2WMt1(S0N«tiM 
L*lBn.UtfiM041 
M o ^ U M T i - U . U &A,VTC.L\\ 
Notary Public 
Residing At: Salt Lake County, Utah 
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ADDENDUM 4 
Rule 38. Jury trial of right. 
(a) Right preserved. The right of trial by jury as declared by the constitution 
or as given by statute shall be preserved to the parties. 
(b) Demand. Any party may demand a trial by jury of any issue triable of 
right by a jury by paying the statutory jury fee and serving upon the other 
parties a demand therefor in writing at any time after the commencement of 
the action and not later than 10 days after the service of the last pleading 
directed to such issue. Such demand may be endorsed upon a pleading of the 
party. 
(c) Same: specification of issues. In his demand a party may specify the 
issues which he wishes so tried; otherwise he shall be deemed to have 
demanded trial by jury for all the issues so triable. If he has demanded trial by 
jury for only some of the issues, any other party, within 10 days after service 
of the demand or such lesser time as the court may order, may serve a demand 
for trial by jury of any other or all of the issues of fact in the action. 
(d) Waiver. The failure of a party to pay the statutory fee, to serve a demand 
as required by this rule and to file it as required by Rule 5(d) constitutes a 
waiver by him of trial by jury. A demand for trial by jury made as herein 
provided may not be withdrawn without the consent of the parties. 
(Amended effective Jan. 1, 1987.) 
ADDENDUM 5 
Rule 39. Trial by jury or by the court. 
(a) By jury. When trial by jury has been demanded as provided in Rule 38, 
the action shall be designated upon the register of actions as a jury action. The 
trial of all issues so demanded shall be by jury, unless 
(1) The parties or their attorneys of record, by written stipulation filed with 
the court or by an oral stipulation made in open court and entered in the 
record, consent to trial by the court sitting without a jury, or 
(2) The court upon motion or of its own initiative finds that a right of trial 
by jury of some or all of those issues does not exist, or 
(3) Either party to the issue fails to appear at the trial. 
(b) By the court. Issues not demanded for trial by jury as provided in Rule 38 
shall be tried by the court; but, notwithstanding the failure of a party to 
demand a jury in an action in which such a demand might have been made of 
right, the court in its discretion upon motion may order a trial by a jury of any 
or all issues. 
(c) Advisory jury and trial by consent. In all actions not triable of right by a 
jury the court upon motion or of its own initiative may try any issue with an 
advisory jury or, with the consent of both parties, may order a trial with a jury 
whose verdict has the same effect as if trial by jury had been a matter of right. 
ADDENDUM 6 
Rule 52. Findings by the court. 
(a) Effect. In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury or with an 
advisory jury, the court shall find the facts specially and state separately its 
conclusions of law thereon, and judgment shall be entered pursuant to Rule 
58A; in granting or refusing interlocutory injunctions the court shall similarly 
set forth the findings of fact and conclusions of law which constitute the 
grounds of its action. Requests for findings are not necessary for purposes of 
review. Findings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary evidence, shall 
not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, &nd due regard shall be given to the 
opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses. The 
findings of a master, to the extent that the court adopts them, shall be 
considered as the findings of the court. It will be sufficient if the findings of fact 
and conclusions of law are stated orally and recorded in open court following 
the close of the evidence or appear in an opinion or memorandum of decision 
filed by the court. The trial court need not enter findings of fact and conclusions 
of law in rulings on motions, except as provided in Rule 4Kb). The court shall, 
however, issue a brief written statement of the ground for its decision on all 
motions granted under Rules 12(b), 50(a) and (b), 56, and 59 when the motion 
is based on more than one ground. 
(b) Amendment. Upon motion of a party made not later than 10 days after 
entry of judgment the court may amend its findings or make additional 
findings and may amend the judgment accordingly. The motion msty be made 
with a motion for a new trial pursuant to Rule 59. When findings of fact are 
made in actions tried by the court without a jury, the question of the sufficiency 
of the evidence to support the findings may thereafter be raised whether or not 
the party raising the question has made in the district court an objection to 
such findings or has made either a motion to amend them, a motion for 
judgment, or a motion for a new trial. 
(c) Waiver of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Except in actions for 
divorce, findings of fact and conclusions of law may be waived by the parties to 
an issue of fact: 
(1) by default or by failing to appear at the trial, 
(2) by consent in writing, filed in the cause; 
(3) by oral consent in open court, entered in the minutes. 
(Amended effective Jan. 1, 1987.) 
